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INVESTMENT AND THE ANDEAN PACT: FROM POLITICAL RESPONSE TO
LEGAL STRUCTURES TO SAFE HARBORS
Robert Carcano
I. INTRODUCTION
The Latin American experience clearly establishes
that economic development involves profound social and
political change. 2 Despite modernization efforts,
economic benefits eluded Latin American leaders. 3 This
fact led to the widespread perception that a new
international legal structure had to be forged if the
region's myriad social concerns were to be addressed.
Regional economic integration was a necessary first step.
* An abridged version of this article appears in Third
World Legal Studies, 1983 symposium issue. Both
articles have been published with the knowledge and approval
of this author and the editors of Third World Legal
Studies.
T B.A. 1977, Fordham University; M.A. in Political Science,
1978, Fordham University; J.D. 1981, The Dickinson School of
Law. Mr. Carcano is a staff member of the New York City
Special Assistant Corporation Counsel's Office, where he
practices real estate and munitipcal litigation in the
Department of Housing Preservation and Development.
The author expresses his appreciation to Professor John A.
Maher of the Dickinson School of Law for his invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., C. L. Taylor & M. C. Hudson, World
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Chapter 3
(1975).
2. The relationship between economic change and
social unrest has provided political theorists with fertile
grounds for thought. See, e.g., C. E. Welsch, Politi-
cal Modernization (1976); L. W. Pye, Aspects of Political
Development (1966); S. P. Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies (1968); C. Johnson, Revolutionary
Change (1960); C. E. Welch & M. B. Taintor, Revolution
and Political Change (1972); T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel
(1970).
3. The failure to reap benefits from modernization
efforts led to the perception that the problem lay in the
structure of the international economic order. See,
e.g., J. D. Cockcroft, A. G. Frank & D. L. Johnson,
Integration enabled Latin American statesmen to
address insurmountable national problems on a regional
level. In the Latin American context, however, economic
integration efforts became intertwined with the new
nationalism. 4 Despite this beginning, the structures
that eventually arose formed a relationship which assured
investors that adherence to definitive rules would preclude
uncertainty. Indeed, these new relationships promised
creation of a safe harbor.
5
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Growth of Foreign Participation
Latin American statesmen are quite sensitive to
foreign influence in national and regional development
efforts. For them, effective development not only must
achieve its economic objective but "must be under the con-
trol of the state.... Development would not be authentic or
politically acceptable if international cooperation
Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's
Political Economy (1972). See also, H. Magdoff, The
Age of Imperialism (1969). Indeed, the perception forms
the basis for modern political dialogue. See, e.g.,
Final Report, Latin American seminar on the New
International Economic Order held June 2-6, 1980 in Havana
under the auspices of the University of the United Nations.
4. Guerrero, El Regimen commun de la inversi6n
extranjera en el Grupo Andino, 8 Derecho de la Integra-
ci6n [D.D.L.I] 8, 10 (1977). "We ... reaffirm ...
our ... [conviction] ... regarding the plain sovereign
rights of nations to freely dispose of their natural
resources ... It shall be ... our policy to give preference
in economic development of the subregion to capital and
enterprises which are authentically national...."
Id.
5. Id. "The investment of capital and the trans-
fer of foreign technology are necessary contributions for
the development of our countries and should receive assur-
ance of stability in accordance with the extent to which
they constitute positive contributions...." Id. The
phrase "legal structure" may be defined as a system in
which rights, duties and obligations are clearly defined.
To the investor, this would mean erection of a safe harbor
because adherence to these rules would preclude acts of
expropriation and render such acts unjustified.
contributed to a perpetuation of financial and techno-
logical inferiority.
"6
Dependency theorists have long maintained that
foreign participation in national development usurps
national control in key areas of the development process
and that foreign capital displaces national entrepreneur-
ship, pre-empts financing 7 and allows the foreigner to
abuse his unequal bargaining position.8
United States participation in the region, however,
is a post second world war phenomena. U.S. investment in
the Andean region increased dramatically from slightly over
five billion dollars in 1929, to an estimated 13 billion
dollars by the end of the fifties. Of this amount, 7.4
billion dollars consisted of direct U.S. investments.
9
The quantitative change which these figures represent
belies a more significant qualitative change. Before 1950,
investments within the Andean 10 region were primarily
directed at the extractive industries. After 1950, the
policy of import substitution triggered pervasive foreign
participation in manufacturing.
The aim of import substitution policy is the replace-
ment of foreign imports with domestic products. The pro-
cess begins with finished consumer goods and moves toward
6. Saavedra, El regimen uniforme de la empresa
multinacional en el Grupo Andino, 11 D.D.L.I., 11, 18
(1972).
7. See, e.g., K. Fann & D. Hodges, Readings in
U.S. Imperialism (1971). See also supra note 3.
8. For a brief outline of major concerns of
dependency theorists, see Jova, Private Investment in
Latin America, Renegotiating the Bargain, 10 TEX. J. INT'L
L. 455 (1975).
9. Grunwald, Foreign Private Investment: The
Challenge of Latin American Nationalism, 11 VA. J. INT'L
L. 228, 230 (1971).
10. The phrases "Andean Pact", "Andean nations" or
"Andean region", refer collectively to Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
98
higher levels of manufactured products. Foreign
transnationals rapidly recognized the advantages of this
system and began actively participating in the manufac-
turing sector. 1 2  Indeed, within the Andean group, invest-
ment in the extractive industries rose from 1.060 million
dollars to 1.137 million dollars between 1957 and 1967,
while investments in the manufacturing sector rose from 117
million to 396 million dollars during the same period.
1 3
In this sense, foreign transnationals fostered import sub-
stitution policy. They did not, however, question whether
the size of the market permitted economically efficient
plants. The host governments concluded that questions of
economic efficiency were generally immaterial to foreigners
who are protected by high trade barriers. 1 4 The only
immediate concern was penetrating the market:
The result of this indiscriminate invasion of
foreign capital [into the import substitution
process] on the host state was disheartening.
With all new production targeted for the
internal market, there was no increase of
exports, yet there was also no reduction of
imports. Although the importation of finished
products was halted, the import of primary
material and intermediate products to manufac-
ture this final product was considerably aug-
mented. 15
Therefore, if foreign capital was needed to aid national
development, developmental strategy would have to
11. See generally Hirschman, The Political
Economy of Import Substituting Industrialization in Latin
America, 82 Q. ECON. (Feb. 1968). See also U. N.
ECLA, The Process of Industrial Development in Latin
America, U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/716/Rev.I (1966). For a
discussion of the sequence of economic development see
Chenery, Patterns of Industrial Growth, 50 AM. ECON.
REV. (Sept. 1960).
12. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 12.
13. Figures are from M. Wionczek, El Grupo Andino y
la Inversi6n extranjera (1970), cited in Guerrero,
supra note 4, at 12.
14. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
15. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 12.
meaningfully delineate between necessary foreign
participation and sensitive or undesirable activity.
B. Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Concerns
Certainly, subversion of economic policy frustrated
Latin American leaders. Yet the acquisition of smaller and
medium sized national firms was also a matter of grave con-
cern. 16 Between 1958 and 1967, for instance, of the
ninety-six subsidiaries of foreign enterprises which
initiated activity in Columbia, only forty-eight were
entirely new, twelve were of unidentifiable origin, one was
a subsidiary of another, and thirty-five were acquisitions
of firms already in existence. In Peru, a similar pattern
was evident, of sixty-two firms, thirty-six were entirely
new, and twenty-three were acquisitions of firms already in
existence. 17
Concomitant with these concerns was an increasing
inability of the host government to control the decisions
of these foreign enterprises or the ramifications of their
decisions on the host state.1 8 The powerful global
stance of the "true transnationals" enabled them to
maximize profits without considering the environments in
16. These practices severely handicapped the develop-
ment of indigenous enterprises.
17. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 13, 16.
18. For an interesting account of international corpo-
rate misconduct, see A. Sampson, The Sovereign State of
I.T.T. (1973). "While I.T.T. was so passionately devoting
itself to blocking and bringing down a Marxist government
in Chile, it was at the very same time negotiating with the
communists in Moscow to open up the huge potential new
market as the Cold War thawed..." Id. at 294.
which particular subsidiaries operated. 1 9  Indeed, this
situation provided support for the adage that "the interest
of the state is not a factor in the invisible hand's search
for profits."
2 0
Studies conducted by the Chilean Corporation for
Development concluded that "55% of the foreign enterprises
questioned responded that it would not be feasible for them
to export to the area's market since they had subsidiaries
operating in the majority of the states in the area."
21
The result is de facto division of markets, which is not
necessarily in the nation's best interest. This same study
concluded that 70% of those firms consulted paid royalties
for the use of patented and unpatented technology
22
abroad. Providers of technology clearly had a unique
bargaining stance in Latin America.
Antitrust issues such as common contractual provi-
sions used by foreign firms also became a matter of con-
cern. Tying agreements were often utilized as vehicles to
19. See, e.g., R.J. Barnet & R.E. Muller, Global
Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations 123-
210 (1974). The disruptive aspect of corporate activity is
the subject of United Nations efforts under the auspices of
the Transnational Corporation Center. At this writing a
draft has been completed. See, e.g., Rutledge, United
Nations Code of Conduct for Transnationals--The Mask of Law
Hiding the Deceit of Politics, 6 DICK. INT'L TRADE ANN.
269 (1978-79). (The Dickinson International Trade Annual
is an annual compilation of seminar papers submitted by
student participants in an International Trade course. The
Dickinson International Trade Annual is located only in the
Sheely-Lee Law Library of the Dickinson School of Law,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania.)
20. A policy of enlightened self-interest, however,
would indicate the contrary. See A. Smith, Wealth of
Nations (1776).
21. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 17 (citing a study
conducted by the Chilean Corporation for Development,
Comportamiento de las principales empresas industriales
extranjeras acogidas al DFL 258 Santiago de Chile (1970)).
DFL 280 is the statute which regulates investment.
22. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 18.
remit profits. Such agreements mandated that a subsidiary
use only an intermediate or primary product of another
subsidiary or of the parent. One study concluded that
"if... [Columbia] could reduce the price of its
intermediate product and capital goods by ... at least 20%
it could have saved in 1968, a sum equivalent to 50% of all
its exports, excepting coffee and petroleum.
" 23
What enabled transnational corporations to perpetuate
and further their interests in this manner was the desir-
ability of their technology. Such technology typically
enters the country in the form of goods or is transferred
as technical knowledge, formulas, drawings or know-how:
If it arrives as part of direct foreign invest-
ment two situations can arise. One is that tech-
nological participation is remunerated as royalty
payments which are generally fixed as a percentage
of volume of sale of the respective products. The
other possibility ... is that technological par-
ticipation is considered part of capital which
carries the right to retire the capital and to
remit profits. 24
The effect of this process is twofold. First, equity par-
ticipation of foreign firms is augmented. Secondly,
revenues to the host government are severely diminished.
Inclusion of restrictive clauses also led to a widely
held perception that in bilateral negotiations between
Andean States and the developed world, the latter had an
insurmountable advantage:
It would be redundant, in regard to Andean
buyers to state that [negotiating] ability is
always on the side of the provider, accustomed
to negotiating with buyers who generally lack
the most elemental information and ignore what
they are really buying and whether there are
other alternatives which could produce similar
products. 25
23. Guerrero, supra note 4, (citing a study by
Constantino V. Vaitsos for Departamiento Nacional de
Planeaci6n, Columbia).
24. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 20.
25. Id.
Among the clauses most frequently employed were clauses pro-
hibiting export of products manufactured with imported
technology, tying agreements and clauses prohibiting manu-
facture of products similar to imported goods. 26 The
problem was clear:
Legislation on industrial property ... did not
consider tying an illegal activity ... laws
regarding patents and trademarks did not cor-
respond to the needs of development. 27
C. Political Response: Expropriation
Economic change induces political and social un-
rest. 28  In Latin America, seemingly intractable social
issues triggered a search for causes. The legality of
foreign activity came under increasingly closer scrutiny
and, ultimately, vehement attack.
Expropriation of property interests, held in large
part, by U.S. based enterprises, has been largely a Latin
26. Certainly questions concerning the extraterri-
torial effect of U.S. antitrust laws abound. In the con-
text of a post-World War II Andean World, the point being
made differs. Political response bespeaks perceptions.
The perception generated by economic relations between
these states and the developed world was a study of con-
trasts. While the developed world often perceived itself
as omnipotent and technologically advanced, the Andean
states perceived themselves as impotent. In bilateral
transfer of technology negotiations, Andean nations felt
obliged to accept contracts of adhesion. North American
concepts of arms-length negotiations alone cause conceptual
difficulties in accepting the perception of Andean
impotence. These conceptual difficulties are clarified,
nevertheless, by considering the politics of the day.
See, e.g, Comment, Sherman Act Litigation: A Modern
Generic Approach to Objective Territorial Jurisdiction and
the Act of State Doctrine, 84 DICK. L. REV. 645 (1980).
27. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 21.
28. See, supra note 2.
American phenomenon.29 More properly, expropriation has
been a political response 30 to pervasive U.S. and Cana-
dian presence in Latin states.
1. Relief in U.S. Courts: The Act of State Doc-
trine.--In January 1959, Fidel Castro ascended to a posi-
tion of authority in Cuba. What followed was widespread
expropriation of property held by American interests.
American firms sought relief in the courts.
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered
the act of state doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino.3 1 This decision and its progeny caused
foreign investors to seek a safe harbor in the same port in
which they sought to maximize profits. 32  Sabbatino
provided the High Court with an opportunity to address a
sensitive aspect of the Court's role in the conduct of
foreign policy.
29. Mexico - land seizures in 1915; Bolivia - Standard
Oil 1936; Mexico - nationalization of all petroleum prop-
erties and rights 1938; Argentina (Peron) - confiscation of
the major American and Foreign Power Subsidiaries 1943-
1946; Bolivia - tin mines 1952; Guatemala - United Fruit
Company 1963; Argentina - expropriation of another American
and Foreign Power affiliate 1958; Brazil - 1959; Venezuela
- Sulphur Corporation properties and revocation of con-
cessions; these are some of the major cases. Eder, Expro-
priation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAW 611-12
(1970).
30. Even the motivation behind the Foreign Aid program
became suspect. See, e.g., S. Weissman, The Trojan
Horse, A Radical Look at Foreign Aid (1975).
31. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). "Expropriations take place for a variety of rea-
sons, political and ideological as well as economic ... If
the political branches are unwilling to exercise their
ample powers to effect compensation, this reflects a judg-
ment of the national interest which the judiciary would be
ill-advised to undermine indirectly." Id. at 435-36.
32. The decision signified the end of gun boat diplo-
macy. The Marines would no longer be coming to halt expro-
priation of property.
The Court held that the act of state doctrine bars
inquiry into acts of a sovereign within its own terri-
tory. 33 The Court reasoned that the doctrine is dictated
by the basic relationship between branches of government in
a system of separation of powers. 34 This doctrine,
explained the Court, "concerns the competency of dissimilar
institutions to make and implement particular kinds of deci-
sions in the area of international relations. " 35  It is
not compelled by either the inherent nature of sovereign
authority or by principles of international law.
36
Redress from expropriation would have to result from nego-
tiations between sovereign powers or from other similar
tactics.
2. Hickenlooper Amendment.--After the Sabbatino
decision, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act
37
of 1961 to establish the policy that American Courts should
33. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 407, 421 (1964).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 419.
37. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §
2370(e)(2), (Supp. V. 1970). The Hickenlooper amendment
states:
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, no court in the United States
shall decline on the ground of the fed-
eral act of state doctrine to make
a determination on the merits giving
effect to the principles of international
law-in a case in which a claim of title
or other right to property is asserted by
any party including a foreign state (or a
party claiming through such state) based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation
or other taking after January 1, 1959, by
an act of that state in violation of prin-
ciples, of international law, including
the principles of compensation and the
other standards set out in this
subsection: Provided, That this sub-
paragraph shall not be applicable (1) in
any case in which an act of a foreign
not refrain from adjudication of the merits of a case
because of the act of state doctrine. Subsequent
litigation sought to determine whether the intent of the
Amendment was to overrule Sabbatino or to modify its
holding. 38 Courts presented with the expropriation
problem evidenced a keen sensitivity to political reality,
a concern for judicial integrity and an awareness of
constitutional limitations. These decisions, coupled with
the conciliatory approach adopted by the Executive branch,
rendered increasingly clear the need for new rules to
clarify the role of foreign capital abroad. If American
municipal law was capable of articulation, however,
agreement on international rules of expropriation was
unlikely, at best.
state is not contrary to national law or
with respect to a claim of title or other
right to property acquired pursuant to an
irrevocable letter of credit of not more
than 180 days duration issued in good
faith prior to the time of the
confiscation or other taking, or (2) in
any case with respect to which the
President determines that application of
the act of state doctrine is required in
that particular case by the foreign
policy interests of the United States and
a suggestion to this effect is filed on
his behalf in that case with the court.
38. See, e.g., French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 433, 242 N.E.2d 704 (1968),
see also, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City
Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). This latter
case strictly construed the wording and legislative intent
of the Hickenlooper Amendment. In pertinent part the Court
held that:
One of the principal reasons for the proposed
amendment is that it will serve notice that
foreign states taking action against U.S. invest-
ment in violation of international law cannot
market the product of their expropriation in the
U.S. free from litigation.
Pointing to legislative history the Court noted that:
Congressman Gross ... urged that the Amend-
ment be broadened to enable the owner of
expropriated property to seize Cuban assets
3. Differing Legal Standards on Expropriation.--
Acts of expropriation occurred in an intellectually tenuous
context. North American scholarship had articulated a duty
between a sovereign and an alien whose property had been
expropriated. The sovereign could expropriate property
only to effectuate a proper purpose. Under this view,
expropriation could not be discriminatory, and provision
had to be made for payment of compensation.
39
Latin American scholarship, however, had never
accepted the existence of such a standard. The
in the United States as an offset for the
value of property seized by Cuba ... However,
First National City has cited no legislative
history, and we have found none, which
indicates that Mr. Gross's suggestion was
thought to have been adopted by Congress when
it reenacted the Hickenlooper Amendment.
Id. 396-97 and 402.
Moreover the court in First National took note
of Congressional policy inherent in Subchapters V
of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949,
22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-1643k (1970 Supp.) in which
Congress provided for "the determination of the
amount and validity of claims against the
Government of Cuba ...
arising out of nationalization, expropriation
intervention, or other takings of ... property of
nationals of the U.S. The Court also took note of
the fact that Congress and the Executive had acted
pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50
U.S.C. App. 5 (1970 Supp.) Proc. 3447, 22 Fed.
Reg. 1085, 3 C.F.R. (1959-63) to block all Cuban
assets present in the U.S. but had not provided for
vesting of the blocked Cuban assets. Id. at 403.
39. One statement of the North American scholarly
view on expropriation appears in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
of FOREIGN RELATIONS. Section 185 provides that
taking is wrongful under International law ...
[when]
(a) it is not for a public purpose, (b) there
is not reasonable provision for the deter-
mination and payment of just compensation ...
under the law and practice of the state in
effect at the time of taking ...
Comment b ... [Tihere is little authority in
international law establishing any useful
criteria by which a state's own determination
of public purpose can be questioned....
conventional Latin American position was based on
traditional international law. These scholars felt that
"states [were] bound to treat the property of aliens in
substantially the same manner in which they treat[ed] the
property of their own nationals."
4 0
The international community system had begun to per-
ceive that the international economic order functioned to
the detriment of the new citizen states. Those nations
which had not participated in the formation of the post-
World War II economic order, began to express their dis-
content. The content of expropriation decrees illustrates
this new position. In Bolivia's nationalization of the
Gulf Oil Co., General Alfredo Quando Cundia stated:
[Tihe ... fundamental charter of the state
establishes that, the private accumulation of
economic power in such degree that it may place
the economic independence of the state in danger
will not be permitted; ... whereas the firm,
Bolivia Gulf Oil Company has set itself up as a
The concept ... originating in municipal law
systems may have had a reasonably definite
meaning in international law when municipal
systems ... were based on private ownership
of the means of production. However, in view
of the increasingly broad area of governmental
activity in nearly all states, the concept of
public purpose ... seems increasingly vague and
of doubtful usefulness in the future.
Comment c. It is often stated that the taking of
an alien's property is a violation of international
law unless the state pays just compensation. Since
payment is frequently delayed until sometime after
the taking this would suggest that the legality of
the taking may be determined ab initio by subsequent
events.... The subsequent determination could
present serious problems to third parties (which
treat a taking as in ineffective in passing
title).... The rule stated ... treats a taking as
unlawful on the ground of failure to pay just
compensation only if it does not appear at the time
of the taking that just compensation will be
provided....
40. See, e-g., Futuovros, International Law and
the Third World, 50 VA. L. REV. 783, 807-08 (1964). The
consistency of this viewpoint can be gauged by the inter-
change between the then Mexican Ambassador in Washington to
then Secretary of State Hull regarding expropriation of
land belonging to U.S. citizens in Mexico in 1927. Hull:
108
new super state, which has at its disposal an
economic and political power greater than that
of the Bolivian State, incompatible with the
principle and practice of national sovereignty
... [it has violated this mandate.] 41
This changed perception was as pervasive as it was
permanent. One study by the Rand Corporation concluded
that in Peru and Brazil, military training had created an
expanded concept of national security:
Military leaders began to perceive national
security problems as extending beyond conven-
tional military operations in large part
because many of the existing social and eco-
nomic structures seemed so inefficient or un-
just as to create conditions for and give legiti-
macy to, revolutionary protest, and hence, con-
stitute a security threat. 42
Often the military men were the best educated contingent of
the population. An expanded concept of national security
in the hands of a military man can be a powerful persuader
of civilian governments.
land belonging to U.S. citizens in Mexico in 1927. Hull:
The taking of property without compensation is
not expropriation. It is confiscation.... If
it were permissible for a government to take
the private property of the citizens of other
countries and pay for it as and when; in the
judgment of that government, its economic cir-
cumstances and its local legislation may perhaps
permit, the safeguards which ... established
international law has sought to provide would
be illusory ...
Reply: Without attempting to refute the point of
the American Government, I wish to draw your
attention ... to the fact that agrarian
reform is ... one of the aspects of a pro-
gram of social betterment [within a govern-
ment's ambit] ... There does not exist in inter-
national law any principle universally ac-
cepeted by the countries nor by the writers
of treatises on this subject, that would
render obligatory the giving of adequate
compensation for expropriations of a general
and impersonal character. Nevertheless,
Mexico admits, in obedience to her own laws,
that she is indeed under an obligation to
indemnify ... but as she maintains ... based
on the most authoritative ... writers and on
international law, that time and manner of such
payments must be determined by her own laws.
3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 656-68 (1942).
III. REGIONAL INTEGRATION
A. The Search for Optimum Markets
Like their European counterparts, Latin American
statesmen came to realize that the success of countries
like the United States was at least partially attributable
to the economies of scale made possible by large internal
markets. That perception served as the impetus for the
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).
For a discussion of the various legal mechanisms avail-
able to protect against expropriation in the original con-
tract see Wesley, Expropriation Challenge in Latin
America: Prospects for Accord on Standards and Pro-
cedures, 46 TUL. L. REV. 232, 254-91 (1971).
41. Bolivia: Nationalization of Bolivia Gulf, Oct.
17, 1969. 8 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1663 (1969). After
arduous negotiations, a compensation arrangement was
finally arrived at on September 10, 1970. The government
agreed to pay $78,622,171 to be tendered in installments
over a 20 year period beginning in 1973. Wesley, supra,
note 38, at 233, 238-40. For the Peruvian dealings with
the International Petroleum Company and International Tele-
phone and Telegraph see 7 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1201 (1968);
8 INT'L L. MATERIALS 765 (1969); 9 INT'L L. MATERIALS 80,
186, 921 (1970).
42. Einaudi, Latin American Institutional Develop-
ment: Changing Military Perspective in Peru and Brazil,
(1971), Rand 1, 12. General Cavero then director of CAEM
(the Peruvian Center for Higher Military Studies) spoke at
a time when relations with the United States had improved
from a low ebb in early 1969, when application of the
Hickenlooper Amendment seemed imminent, threatening to cut
U.S. economic assistance and sugar quotas in response to
the I.P.C. nationalization. The threat has varied over
time. At first it was narrowly military in nature. Then
new and subtler psychological and ideological threats arose
against the security of each country. "Today we face a new
threat: economic aggression ... we are now fighting
against economic aggression." Id. at 30-31. See
also R.E. Nicoll, Peru's Institutional Revolution
(1973) and A.F. Lowenthal, The Peruvian Experiment
(1975).
Before integration efforts could be undertaken, a
concerted effort had to be made to alter traditional
trade patterns. 43 Each nation would have to pursue
necessary industrialization internally where access to
44
markets was unimpeded. Reorientation from importation
of manufactured goods from Europe and the United States and
exportation of cash crops and raw materials would be
necessary to develop regional industries which could
utilize the area's supply of primary production and satisfy
the regional demand for manufactured products. It was
quite clear that "unless the volume of sale reached a
certain minimum, the cost per unit and the price to the
consumer would be high and capacity to compete low."
45
Moreover, it was becoming evident that when confined to
national boundaries, import substitution destroyed the
benefits of economies of scale. Products such as iron,
steel, chemical fertilizers, pulp and paper, industrial and
farm machinery could be most effectively produced through
economies of scale.
46
Regional integration would also make possible region-
wide specialization of industry. Such specialization
43. Johnson, The Montevideo Treaty for a Latin
American Free Trade Area U. ILL. L.F. 715 (1965).
44. See generally U.N. ECLA, The Process of Indus-
trial Development in Latin America U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/716/-
Rev. I, 1966. For a discussion of the usual sequence of
industrial development see Chenery, Patterns of Indus-
trial Growth, 50 AM. ECON. REV. (Sept. 1960).
45. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade
Expansion and Economic Integration Among Developing Coun-
tries, TD/B/85 Rev. 1 (1966).
46. Indeed if Latin American "demand for steel over
the next ten years were satisfied in the framework of a
regionally integrated market ... investment capital
amounting to $3.7 billion could be saved". Id. at 7.
See also B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic I-tegration
120-43 (1961).
would replace monopoly and complacent national management
with multi-plant industries:
47
In particular, if the great difference in
degrees of development which presently exist
among developing countries are not to increase,
it is indispensable to devise special mechanisms
in order to ensure that the benefits of integra-
tion are equitably distributed among the partnercountries. 
4
B. Integration Options
Creation of a regional market requires coordination
of various policies. Common policy on tariff and trade as
well as common fiscal, social and investment policy are
critical. The development of infrastructures, such as
transport and communication networks, is also a matter
requiring coordination.
Latin American leaders realized that the integration
process in Europe offered no clues for the creation of a
Latin American market. In Europe, "the channels of trade
were all there, ready made ... facilities were available
... In Latin America, on the other hand, ... [it was]
a matter of creating something that never before
existed." 4 9  Nevertheless, an initial decision had to be
made, namely what level of integration would be most
47. Early studies conducted by the U.N.'s Economic
Council on Latin America concluded that the main obstacle
to the creation of a free trade area would be the regions
internal customs structure. These include: tariffs,
quotas, import regimes, exchange surcharges, taxes on
remittances of funds, counsular fees, prior deposit
requirement and direct controls such as license
requirements and exchange quotas. See U.N. HCLA, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.12 1554 (1961).
48. See supra note 45, at 10.
49. S. Dell, The Early Years of LAFTA's Experience;
Michael Wionczek (ed.), Latin American Economic Integra-
tion: Experience and Prospects 107 (1966). See also
Dell, Trade Blocs and Common Markets (1963).
appropriate to the region. Economic theory provided three
integrative mechanisms--free trade areas, common markets
and custom unions.
50
A common market represents the most pervasive and per-
manent level of integration. In addition to removal of
internal tariffs and creation of a common external tariff,
barriers to mobility of capital, labor and other such
factors must be eliminated. Its irrevocable nature
encourages investment.
A free trade area eliminates tariff and nontariff
barriers to trade among the members of the association and
allows each member to retain its own commercial policy
toward third party nations.
51
The third mechanism, custom unions, combines the free
trade area with a common external tariff. The principal
difficulty here is the creation of a common tariff.
Practically speaking, many national laws impinge on trade.
The union requires agreement only on those laws which
directly relate to trade.
C. Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
1. Prelude.--Post World War Two Latin America
experienced high growth rates. However, by 1958 these
rates, made possible by the high price of primary products,
decreased dramatically. One commentator has stated that
50. R. Blough & J. Bochman, Problems of Regional Inte-
gration in Latin America 18-23 (1968).
51. This arrangement is subject to abuse. It may be
profitable to move goods from outside the region into the
free trade area through the country having the lowest
tariff. This movement would defeat the protectionist
devices of higher tariff countries. Solution of this abuse
lies in strict enforcement of "rules of origin" subjecting
violators to estoppel.
only the acceleration of import ausbstitution would ensure
continued economic growth. Otherwise, he estimated that:
[Dlemand for food stuffs and minerals,
principal exports of Latin America, would not
expand to a level of 3.9%. This loss of
market for primary products would produce a
strong limitation on the level of investments
... and the possibility of obtaining external
financing to expand productive processes.
These concerns were not shared by all nations.
Indeed, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil had practically
completed the import substitution process by relying on
their larger markets and consequent economies of scale.
Together, they had acquired 44% of all Latin American
imports. Columbia and Chile also advanced, but the
remaining states were either initiating the process or were
in the first stages of such development.
5 3
The above figures revealed basic disparities among the
economies of the various nations of the would be Latin
common market. Only a free trade area would ensure
region-wide participation. The preamble to the Treaty of
Montevideo5 4 envisioned the progressive formation of a
common market. The effective date for the free trade area
was 1973, but this date was subsequently extended to 1980
by resolution.5 5 LAFTA was later replaced by the Latin
American Integration Association. 56
52. A.C. Gonzales, Reflexiones sobre el futuro de al
ALALC, Integraci6n Latino America 7, 12-13 (1979).
53. Id. at 13.
54. Treaty of Montevideo, Feb. 18, 1960, Multilateral
U.N. Doc. E/CN/621 (1962).
55. Id. at art. 2. Extension of the executory
period was accomplished by Resolution 261. See 6
D.D.L.I. (1970), Resoluci6n 261 (IX) Protocolo Modifica-
torio de el Tratado de Montevideo (Protocol Modifying the
Treaty of Montevideo).
56. The text of the Treaty establishing the successor
to LAFTA appears at 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 672 (1981).
Article 54 of LAIA provides:
The aim of the Treaty of Montevideo was expansion and
diversification of trade. 57 This required gradual aboli-
tion of trade restrictions and negotiation of complemen-
tarity agreements. 5 8 Although such agreements would insure
monopolization of certain sectors, they were dictated by
rational market factors. Complementarity agreements:
take into account and cultivate natural comple-
mentarities through intergovernmental
accords .... The basic objective ... [is] ...
facilitation of industrialization ... to
provide an incentive to industrial investment
on a regional basis and ... aid the
integration ... of a particular industry ...
2. LAFTA Structures.--Although the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA) has replaced LAFTA struc-
ture, proper analysis of present trends in regional inte-
gration should include an historical consideration of LAFTA
structures. During the twelve year executory period,
member states were required to gradually eliminate duties,
charges and all other restrictions on substantially all
area products. 6 0 Each contracting party was to obtain
equivalent concessions (effective reciprocity) in the
The juridical status of the Latin American Free
Trade Association ... shall continue, ... in the
Latin American Integration Association. Accord-
ingly, from the moment of the entry into effect
of this Treaty, the rights and obligations of the
Latin American Free Trade Association shall cor-
respond to the Latin American Integration Associa-
tion.
For an analysis of LAIA's structure, see infra notes
117-185 and accompanying text.
57. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 54, at articles
14-17.
58. Whenever an area specializes in the production of
goods which it produces most efficiently and trades with
other areas within a region doing likewise, economic comple-
mentarity is the result. See supra note 43, at 724.
59. Johnson, supra note 43, at 724. The intent to
negotiate a complementarity agreement must be communicated
to the Committee, and the negotiations must be open to all
member states. The agreements must contain accession
clauses so that other members may adhere.
60. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 54, at art. 3.
1i5
periodic negotiation of reduction in duties, charges and
other trade restrictions. 61 Reductions achieved through
negotiation were to be listed on national schedules.
Another schedule, the common schedule, noted those goods on
which all member states agreed to remove import duties and
restrictions within the twelve year period originally
envisoned by LAFTA's promoters. Chapter II, articles 2-13
set out the trade liberalization program. National
schedules were to include the largest possible number of
products traded among LAFTA countries. 62 Requests for
such concessions were to be exchanged through the Standing
Executive Committee. 63
Reduction of import duties levied by each member of
the association were to average no less than 8% for each
year computed cumulatively. In determining such reduc-
tions, realization of import quotas and exchange controls
were to be taken into consideration. Negotiation by pairs
or groups of nations was allowed. The Standing Executive
Committee was responsible for calculating average levels of
reductions negotiated by each state to assure that the
average reduction negotiated by each state complied with
minimum requirements of the Treaty.
64
The common schedule, as has already been indicated,
lists goods on which all members agree to eliminate duties,
charges and other trade restrictions. This aspect of the
liberalization program initially envisioned triennial
meetings, where all regional trade was to take place. 65
Inclusion of products in the common schedule was to be
61. Id. at art. 4.
62. Id. at art. 2-13.
63. Id. at art. 4.
64. Id. at art. 5.
65. Id. at art. 7 and at art. 9.
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final. Concessions granted were to be irrevocable. If a
concession produced significant disadvantages, a state
could request LAFTA members to consider adoption of
nonrestrictive measures to remedy the situation.6 6  If
injury resulted from trade liberalization other than
concessions, article 12 compelled the contracting parties
to use every effort within their power to remedy the
resultant disadvantages. 67
Chapter VI contains additional savings clauses con-
cerning commodity imports, unfavorable balance of payment
and agricultural imports. Article 23 addresses reper-
cussions on specific productive activities of vital impor-
tance to a state's economy. Article 24 considers the cor-
rection of balance of payment irregularities. It provides
that members adopting measures to correct their balance of
payment must do so temporarily and without discriminating
against products in the LAFTA trade liberalization program.
If immediate relief is necessary, no permission is
required.6 8  In no event, however, are such measures to
remain in effect beyond one year without negotiations
leading to the termination of such remedial measures. 69
Moreover, agricultural imports listed in the trade liberali-
zation program may be restricted in order to protect sup-
plies and to maintain prices at a level necessary to
supplement domestic production. A state may also apply
non-discriminatory measures to equalize the prices of
domestic and imported products.
70
66. Id. at art. 8.
67. Id. at art. 11, 12.
68. Id. at art. 25. See arts. 23 and 24.
69. Id. at art. 26.
70. Id. at ch. VIII, art. 28.
The Treaty includes measures aimed at less developed
economies. Such measures include preferential concessions
to encourage the introduction or expansion of specific pro-
ductive capacity, more permissive reduction schedules
regarding import duties and other restrictions and more
liberal balance of payment corrective measures than article
24. 71 The Treaty also includes a "most favored nation
clause. ,,72
The LAFTA members pledged themselves 73 to facili-
tate complementarity agreements by coordinating policy on
import and export regimes as well as policy on capital goods
and services from outside the Association. The pledge is
supplemented by Article 1674 which addresses the coordina-
tion of industrialization policies. Its objective
were to sponsor agreements among representatives of the
economic sector concerned and to negotiate mutual agree-
ments on complementary economies by industrial sectors.
The Treaty also provides for the juridical person-
ality of LAFTA. 75 All LAFTA employees enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities.
In 1965 a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was
created to terminate the lack of real executive power. The
Council is responsible for the establishment of general
norms to complement objectives of the Treaty. It also
ensures the harmonious process of economic and social
integration and resolution of major policy issues.
71. See id. art. 33.
72. Id. at art. 18.
73. Id. at ch. III, art. 25.
74. See id. ch. III, art. 16.
75. See id. ch. IX, art. 46.
Although LAFTA's structure has been the subject of
criticism from many sources, none is as prophetic as that
of Professor Johnson who stated:
The success of the first four annual conferences
has to some extent been due to the fact that
initial concessions were easily come by because
tariff structures were higher than necessary. As
more reliance is placed on negotiations and co-
operative commitment, there is less chance that
LAFTA will survive basic dissensions especially
since the association is devoid of any institu-
tional arrangement for conflict resolution....
Moreover because a concession may be withdrawn
from a national schedule upon compensation being
made or by virtue of the Treaty's escape clauses,
a certain impermanence is imparted to a con-
cession which further inhibits commercial
response. 76
3. Dissension From Within.--LAFTA's smaller
members did not fare well within the association's frame-
work. They charged that the economic priority of the
United States had been replaced by that of Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico. Between 1962 and 1966 these three
states, already holding an aggregate of 80% of regional
industrial production doubled their net regional trade
balance, primarily in the industrial sector. This may be
contrasted with the middle powers who holding 17% of
regional industrial production, doubled their net regional
trade deficit. The least developed states, with 3% of
regional industrial production changed from regional
creditors to debtors. 77 Annual negotiations on a product
by product basis subject to reciprocity of benefits,
favored Mexico, Brazil and Argentina for several reasons:
(1) the size of their markets required greater concessions,
(2) the industrial products produced by the lesser
developed countries (L.D.C.'s) were not needed by the
76. See supra note 43, at 722-23.
77. Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 HOUS. L. REV.
487, 489 (1971).
larger states and (3) operation of the most favored nation
clause.
Economic disparity was not unforeseen. In 1955 the
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America proposed a draft
which suggested recognition of three distinct groups of
nations "with the object of allowing the more developed
states in the area to grant special and transitory con-
cessions to the medium and lesser developed states ... how-
ever ... [when the Treaty was implemented] ... the three
categories were not established."
78
Studies would later note that elimination of trade
barriers encouraged the tendency of investments to
concentrate in the more advanced countries of the region.
Factors such as the existence of a skilled labor force and
existing economic infrastructure almost guaranteed higher
returns on capital. 79 Concomitantly, participation in an
integrated market denies lesser developed states the
protection usually afforded to nascent industry:
In short, unless special measures are taken in
favor of the weaker country, the establishment of
free trade within a regional market would bring
into operation or stimulate cumulative processes
similar to those which have led the world in
general to the existing patterns of relationships
between the developed and the developing coun-
tries. 80
78. Andean, 5 D.D.L.I. 117 (1968).
79. See supra note 45, ch. IV 20.
80. Id. The study indicates that some measures
include: (1) allowing smaller-lesser developed countries
(S.L.D.C.'s) to keep their barriers up longer, (2)
exempting S.L.D.C.'s from requirement of higher customs
duty, (3) granting S.L.D.C's preferential access to
markets, (4) creating fiscal incentives and state aids to
enterprises settling in the less advanced countries, (5)
freeing the movement of persons and (6) prioritizing the
improvement of their infrastructures. See id. at
23-25. See also B.I. Watsons, Function of Fiscal
Incentives in Modifying the Imbalance in the Distribution
of Costs and Benefits in the Regional Integration Efforts
of Developing Countries in Actual Problems of Economic
Integration, UNCTAD Pt. TD/B/517, at 18.
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Other scholars phrased the problem in more poetic terms:
We don't adhere to the Calvinist formula ... of to
he who has, may more be given, and to he who has
little, what little he has he may be deprived of.
On the contrary, we think that equity lies in a
distribution of cost and benefits that favors most
he that has least. And not because of inter-
national philanthropy but rather because we are
certain ... that the accelerated development of
the weaker is a problem that concerns all members
of the community.... Seen in this manner, equity
is synonymous with collective convenience, and
should be practiced in the broadest possible
manner.
According to Professor Santos, the favorable
provisions in the Treaty of Montevideo "do not impose an
obligation. "8 2 Indeed, the transitory nature of such
measures fails to attract investors. Neither are these
provisions applicable to entire industries. Short-term
benefits did not assist the development of L.D.C.'s.
Given this impasse, the future was not difficult to
predict:
The second series of negotiations, lasting over
two years, failed to produce agreement on the
second installment of the Common (Schedule], due
in part to the reluctance of the small and medium
powers to aggravate and perpetuate what seemed to
them the unfair distribution of benefits resulting
from free trade.
81. Santos, El Problema de la desigualidades en la
integraci6n 22-23, D.D.L.I. 14,16 (1976). The author's
comments deserve full exposition:
Classical theorists of international commerce
maintain that any interference in the free and
spontaneous forces of the market causes pertur-
bance and is the font of inefficiency.... This
utopian vision only served to assure that the big
fish would eat the small ... that the countries
on the underdeveloped periphery would provide the
industrialized center with cheap primary goods in
exchange for costly manufacture ... Calvin would
rejoice from his grave seeing that the moral of
[the] fable has such ideal application in the world.
82. Id. at 20.
83. Ereli points out that the L.D.C's did in fact peti-
tion the big three for such concessions but received no
answer. See Ereli, supra note 77, at 490.
84. Id.
D. Subregional Integration Efforts
1. Prelude.--With the meeting of the Presidents of
America at Punta del Este, the concept of a subregional
agreement came into focus. 85 The meeting revealed a con-
sensus on creation of a Latin American Common Market (to be
in effect by 1985). This larger market was to come into
being by the convergence of LAFTA and the Central American
Common Market.8 6 The document contained two provisions
worth noting. First, it envisioned the participation of
foreign capital.8 7 Secondly, the document granted
L.D.C.'s the right "to participate and to obtain
preferential conditions in subregional agreements."
88
Subsequent to this agreement on principle, the
Conference of Contracting Parties, pursuant to mandate
85. Latin American Common Market: Declaration of
Presidents of O.A.S. Member States--Signed at Punta Del
Este, Uruguay, April 14, 1967, 6 INT'L L. MATERIALS 535
(1967) [hereinafter Latin American Common Market Declara-
tion]. Before this meeting Colombia had called a meeting
of the Presidents of Chile, Venezuela and presidential
representatives from Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru to discuss
their common position in view of the forthcoming meeting of
the Presidents, already referred to. At this meeting the
Presidents agreed to establish an Andean Development Corpo-
ration and closer economic ties. (So-called Bogota Declara-
tion.) The Corporation, whose purpose is to foster sub-
regional integration by identifying investment opportun-
ities and participating in them, has an authorized capital
of $100 million. Payment of subscribed capital is to be in
five annual installments. The first installment was to be
in U.S. currency. The remaining; half in American and half
in national currency, provided that full convertibility be
maintained. The agreement was signed on February 7, 1968
and has been in effect since January 30, 1970.
86. Id. at ch. l(a)(b) at 537. "Hostilities between
El Salvador and Honduras starting in 1969 halted the opera-
tion of the Central American Common Market Organizations
... LAFTA ... could not reach agreement on how to proceed
from a free trade area to a common market and twice decided
to postpone the decision." Ereli, supra note 71, at 487.
87. See Latin American Common Market Declaration,
supra note 85, at 537.
88. Latin American Common Market Declaration, supra
note 85, at ch. l(2)(d).
issued by the Declaration of Presidents, established the
norms by which subregional agreements would be judged.
89
Thess norms were presented in the form of Resolution 203.
The Resolution sets out basic principles by which sub-
regional agreements should be guided. 90 By Resolution
203, 91 the Council of Ministers approved the outline of
the subregional agreement presented by Columbia, Chile,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. To effectuate the purposes of
Resolution 202, the Conference of Contracting Parties
approved Resolution 222.92
89. Resolution 202 CCM-II (VI-E) Norms of Subregional
Agreements, Sept. 2, 1967, 2 D.D.L.I. 161 (1968).
90. The Resolution states ten basic principles which
can be summarized as foll6ws: (1) can be by two or more
parties, (2) shall establish the terms of their commercial
policy regarding trade liberalization, (3) must be general
(not restricted to specific sectors) and external tariff
policy, (4) must take into account the subscribers
obligations to LAFTA, (5) complementation agreements must
conform to the principals set out in the Treaty of
Montevideo, (6) shall be transitory, establishing effec-
tive date and duration, (7) the Executive organization
shall be designated by the participants, (8) approval of
Contracting Parties is required--the Conference shall
analyze the agreements annual progress.
91. Resoluci6n 203 CCM-II (VI-E) 2 Sep. 1967, 2
D.D.L.I. 162 (1968). Pages 162-65 of the Resolution
annexed the bases of the agreement.
92. Resoluci6n 222 (VII) of 17 Dec. 1967, 2 D.D.L.I.
165 (1968). The resolution incorporated the guides
discussed in Resolution 202 (note 90 supra) as
affirmative obligations and added several more to effec-
tuate them (dividing tasks to specific LAFTA organiza-
tions). Some of the provisions deserve mention here:
Art. 13--Any contracting parties proposing
the creation of a subregional agreement
shall communicate same to the Committee by
their representative accompanied by informa-
tion supporting the request. The Committee
shall communicate this to the rest of the
contracting parties.
Art. 14--In order to accomplish Art. 13 the
Contracting Parties will elevate the text of
their agreement to the Permanent Executive
Committee.
The promotion of the subregional agreement served to
legitimize the relationship between the Andean Pact and
LAFTA. 9 3  Indeed, even before the adoption of Resolution
203, a study conducted by a Chilean delegation to the
Council of Ministers addressed this question. 94 By
giving the agreement the character of a treaty mechanism,
members could profit from application of the most favored
nation clause without having to reciprocate. Secondly, the
agreements were effectuated by executive act, thus
bypassing legislative approval. Since the Treaty of
Montevideo imposes upon the Committee the task of
facilitating creation of the Latin American Common
95
Market:
[i]t is evident that, at Punta del Este, the Presi-
dents of America resolved to put into execution
the programmatic norms of article 54 by adopting
the decision to accelerate the process of con-
verting LAFTA into a common market.... One of the
many mechanisms that could be adopted ... are pre-
cisely the subregional agreements. These agree-
ments ... constitute a most efficacious means to
create conditions favorable to the establishment
of a common market.
Art. 15--All subregional agreements require,
to be effective, the approval of the Permanent
Executive Committee which shall resolve with an
affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the
contracting parties. The Committee should meet
no later than 30 days after being presented with
the subregional agreement.
93. See generally G. Amador, Andean Legal Order
Ch. II (1978).
94. Compatibility of Subregional Agreements with the
Treaty of Montevideo, 2 D.D.L.I. 170 (1968). Former
President Edwardo Frei of Chile requested in 1964 a study
of the issue of integration, (how it could be more rapidly
achieved). The study's recommendations were later to be
incorporated into the Cartagena Agreement. See Haccia
la integraci6n acelerada de America Latina (Toward
accelerated development of Latin America) Mexico, Fondo de
Cultura Economica (1965).
95. Art. 54 of the Treaty of Montevideo.
96. Compatibility of Subregional Agreements with the
Treaty of Montevideo, 2 D.D.L.I. at 171, n.60. See
also 6 D.D.L.I. 118 (1970) (A question and answer
transcript of sessions between the representatives of the
Permanent Executive Committee and the Mixed Commission of
the Andean Group.)
2. The Andean Pact.--With these conceptual diffi-
culties clarified, the path was cleared for the Agreement
of Cartagena 97 and creation of the Andean Pact. Chapter
I sets forth the purpose of the agreement, to promote
harmonic and balanced development of its member states to
facilitate creation of a common market.
Chapter II establishes the several bodies of the
Treaty. The principal bodies are the Commission and the
"Junta."9 8 The Commission is the supreme body and is com-
posed of one representative from each of the member govern-
99
ments. It establishes the general policy of the Agree-
ment and adopts measures to effectuate them. The Commis-
sion appoints and removes the members of the "Junta," it
passes upon the "Junta's" proposals and monitors for compli-
ance with the Treaty of Montevideo.1 0 0 The Commission
meets three times a year and can be called into special
session by petition of any state or the "Junta." These
meetings are mandatory.
10 1
The "Junta" is composed of three members who serve for a
three year term. The "Junta" represents the regional in-
terest I 02 by executing decisions of the Commission, and
formulating proposals to facilitate compliance with the
agreement. Moreover, the "Junta" is charged with formulating
97. Acuerdo de Cartagena (Agreement of Cartagena) 5
D.D.L.I. (1969). The members are: Colombia, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
98. Id. at art. 5.
99. Id. at art. 6.
100. Id. at art. 7.
101. Id. at art. 10.
102. Id. at art. 13.
development mechanisms of special application to the least
developed of its members, Bolivia and Ecuador.1 0 3 There
is no requirement that the "Junta's" technical staff be of
Andean nationality. 104
Chapter III dictates the manner in which the Agree-
ment is to be effectuated. It addresses common policy
formulation regarding development strategy 10 5 and coordi-
nation of development plans 10 6 through harmonization of
exchange, monetary, financial and fiscal policy (including
regimes for regional and foreign capital).
1 0 7
Article 27 required the Commission to approve and
submit a common procedure for the treatment of foreign
capital, trademarks, patents, licenses and royalties,
before December 31, 1970. Similarly, the Agreement
mandates a common regime for the treatment of multinational
enterprises1 08 and for the regulation of
competition.
10 9
Chapter IV of the Agreement enumerates the savings
clauses which correspond to the savings clauses contained
in the Treaty of Montevideo.
1 10
Chapter V addresses trade liberalization. All
tariffs and other trade barriers of equivalent effect,
whether of a monetary exchange or administrative nature,
are eliminated. il The "Junta" determines which acts
constitute prohibited restrictions.
1 12
103. Id. at art. 15.
104. Id. at art. 16.
105. Id. at art. 25.
106. Id. at art. 26.
107. Id. at art. 26(d), 27.
108. Id. at art. 28.
109. Art. 75, ch. VIII, LAFTA, through Resolution 65
(II) of the Conference of Contracting Parties, had already
created norms governing competition.




The liberalization program is automatic and irrevoc-
able, and includes all products. Total liberalization was
to be accomplished by December 31, 1980. The program of
liberalization is to apply in varying measure to (1)
products destined for the Sectoral Program of Industrial
Development (SPID), (2) products of LAFTA's Common List,
(3) products not produced by any states in the subregion
and (4) products not encompassed within any of these
categories. 113
With the exception of restrictions applicable to
products on the SPID, restrictions of all types were to be
eliminated by December 31, 1970. 11 4 A special regime is
created for Bolivia and Ecuador.
The "Junta" determines which products are to be
115
reserved for sectoral development. Products listed on
LAFTA's common list were mandated to be duty free 180 days
after the effective date of the agreement. The Commission,
pursuant to the "Junta's" proposal, was required to design
a list of products not produced within the subregion and
not reserved for SPID and also was required to select those
products reserved for Bolivia and Ecuador. I1 6 Products




116. Art. 49. "The Andean Pact continues to make
impressive strides. The automotive industry is a success
story. By 1985 the regional demand for vehicles will sur-
pass $10 billion. The market, moreover is well protected
by the common, external and other advantages inherent in
the auto sectorial program." Fernandez, Latin American
Economic Integration, 2 LAW. AM. 152 (1979)
E. Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
Latin American statesmen and social scientists were
painfully aware of LAFTA's shortcomings. LAFTA's trans-
formation into a viable organization would require "a
change of attitude[s] and the participation of high level
government representatives with full political sup-
port." I 1 7 One commentator also noted that:
[iun LAFTA's evolution, political backing has
been very limited. From its very beginning
the support it has received from the diverse
governments have been more of form than sub-
stance.... The future of LAFTA weighs little
in the conscience of public opinion among
participating countries ... But ... what is
much more dramatic is that ... some LAFTA member
countries, in different ways and on many occa-
sions, have demonstrated that they can make
important international political decisions
(without thinking of the regional interest
or can ... forget traditional positions.11 8
The Commission's automotive initiative establishes
a compensated exchange of parts. Under the
system, companies will be able to import
components duty free from other Ancom members or
third country, provided they export an equivalent
value outside the bloc. However, they will not be
permitted to import products that have been
allocated to any member country under the sectoral
programs .... The program meshes perfectly with
General Motors' plan to export at least 100,000
automotive transmissions from Venezuela, and a
similar number of manual transmissions from
Ecuador to countries outside the Andean region.
Andean Group Enacts Autoparts Import Scheme; Regional
Court Planned, 1978 BUS. LATIN AM. 366.
The Group has addressed itself to liberalizing products
on the sectoral lists and has continued to study various
proposals relating to infrastructure. A recently completed
study proposes development of an Andean Highway System.
The system will ultimately link all five Andean countries.
See Fernandez, supra.
117. Gonzalez, Reflexiones Sobre el futuro de la
ALALC, Integraci6n Latino America 7 (Oct. 1979). An
initiative toward this end had been taken with Resolution
370 approved by XVIII Ordinary Conference of the Associa-
tion.
118. Id. at 8.
LAFTA's shortcomings involved more than attitudinal
problems. Closer cooperation was essential on issues such
as the free movement of labor.1 1 9 Moreover, structural
limitations in LAFTA existed, such as the relationship
between smaller and less developed countries. 12 0 A
further limitation was the slow pace of liberaliza-
tion. 121 Perhaps the most glaring deficiency was the
lack of a mechanism to address regional interests.
12 2
Although LAFTA's promoters were aware of the
criticisms levelled at LAFTA, they nevertheless felt that
continuing the integration process was essential. On
August 12, 1980, LAFTA's members1 2 3 subscribed to the
Treaty of Montevideo of 1980. This Treaty created the
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA or
Association). 124
119. For example, regional cooperation could eliminate
Venezuela's need for labor. See Salgado, El Mercado
Regional Latino Americano: el proyecto y la realidad (The
Latin American Common Market: Proposals and Reality),
J.U.N. E.C.L.A. (April 1979).
120. See Gonzalez, supra note 117.
121. This slow pace may best be contrasted with the
irrevocable nature of liberalization within the Andean
Group. See G. Amador, supra note 93, at 26.
122. See Gonzalez, supra note 117, at 18-34 for a
proposed program of readjustment. See also Fernandez,
supra note 116, at 160 for the various concessions
granted at LAFTA's last meeting.
123. In alphabetical order; Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela. These nations now constitute LAIA.
124. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin Ameri-
can Integration Association, [Done August 12, 1980] re-
printed in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 672 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Treaty of Montevideo]. Article 54 provides
that LAIA will succeed to all the rights and responsibili-
ties of LAFTA. Chapter IX of the Treaty provides that the
Treaty is to enter into effect 30 days after the third
country ratifies it. For the remaining countries, the
Treaty becomes effective 13 days after deposit of the
instrument of ratification with the depository (Uruguay).
Moreover, no country can subscribe to the treaty with
reservations. For those signatories who have not ratified
LAIA, "the juridical structure of the Treaty of Montevideo
of February 18, 1960 shall apply ... both in regard to
their reciprocal relations and in their relations with the
signatory countries that have ratified, with respect to all
corresponding matters ...." Id. at art. 65.
The treaty evinces a new approach to integration in
Lati Ameica125
Latin America. 1 Each member state agrees to grant to
other members a regional tariff preference.1 26 Unlike
LAFTA which had a designated life span of 12 years,127
LAIA is an agreement of infinite duration. 128 LAIA's
ultimate purpose is the creation of a Latin American common
market. 129
1. Organization of the LAIA
The Association is guided by four policy making
bodies. The function of each is set forth in Chapter VI of
the Treaty. These policy bodies are the Council of Foreign
Ministers, 130 the Conference of Evaluation and Con-
vergence, 1 31 the Committee of Representatives13 2 and
the Secretariat. 133
125. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
See also Diane Tussie, Latin American Integration:
From LAFTA to LAIA, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW 399.
126. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124 at
arts. 4, 5. Other than this mandatory regional tariff
preference, agreements of partial or regional scope
(defined in articles 7 and 6, respectively) may be made if
members so desire.
127. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
128. Treaty of Montevideo, supra, note 124 at art.
62.
129. Id. at art. 1.
130. Id. at art. 28(a). The Council is composed of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member. However
should a member state assign responsibility for integration
to someone other than the Minister of Foreign Affairs that
official shall be the nation's representative. Id. at
art. 31. The Council meets when the Committee summons it
to a meeting. Id. at art. 32; see note 132 infra.
131. Id. at art. 28(b). The Conference is composed
of the plenipotentiaries of the members and it meets every
three years except when called into special session by the
Committee. Id. at art. 34. See note 132 infra.
132. Id. at art. 28(c). The Committee is to be
composed of a permanent representative from each member and
an alternate.
133. Id. at art. 29. The Secretary General directs
the Secretariats who hold office for a three-year term and
may be reelected for another term. Id. at art. 38.
The Council of Foreign Ministers (the Council) is the
highest ranking body of the Association, which sets the
Association's policy on integration. 1 34  In addition,
the Council has the power to hold hearings to resolve
problems referred by other policy bodies. 135 It also has
the power to delegate decision-making power to other policy
bodies. 136
As overseer of the integration process, the Council
defines the norms by which the integration process will be
conducted. 137 The Council also establishes the norms
that will guide the functioning of the other policy
bois138
bodies. 1 Moreover, the Council must "revise and update
the basic norms regulating the agreements of conver-
gence 1 39 and cooperation with other developing countries
and the respective areas of economic integration."1 40  It
must do likewise for other regional associations or inter-
national organizations. 141
The Council also has the power to admit new member
countries into LAIA. 142 If the integration process
requires corrective measures, the Council must adopt
134. Id. at art. 30.
135. Id. at art. 30(g).
136. Id. at art. 30(h).
137. Id. at art. 30(a).
138. Id. at art. 30(d).
139. The treaty defines convergence as "[T]he progres-
sive multilateralization of agreements of partial scope
through periodic negotiations among the member countries."
Id. at art. 3(b). One of the principal features of LAIA
is its concern that member states seek agreements as well
as closer ties in other economic integration areas. Id.
at art. 24 and 25.
140. Id. at art. 30(f).
141. Id. at art. 30(e).
142. Id. at art. 30(i). Chapter IX of the Treaty
provides that the Treaty is to remain open for adherence
of Latin American countries who so desire. After admission
the Treaty enters into force for such adhering country. At
that time the adherent must put commitments into effect
which derive from regional tariff preferences.
them.14 3  If necessary, the Council can propose
additions or amendments to the Treaty.
1 44
The Conference of Evaluation and Convergence, (the Con-
ference) serves as an advisory body to the Council. While
the Council bears responsibility for adopting corrective mea-
145
sures, the Conference is charged with ascertaining and
recommending the need for such action. 1 46 The Conference
can call upon the Secretariat to study a particular prob-
lem 1 47 and recommend solutions.
The Conference must also promote economic integra-
tion. 1 48  First, the Conference must evaluate the results
of differential treatment accorded less developed coun-
tries 1 49 and current treatment of lesser developed coun-
tries. 15 0  Second, the Conference must encourage agree-
ments on a regional level.1 51  Other duties of the
Conference include negotiating for the regional tariff
preference and facilitating convergence of agreements of
152
limited scope.
The Committee of Representatives (the Committee) pro-
vides needed continuity to the character of the Association.
The extensive list of duties and powers applicable to this
policy body1 53 is a form of .trouble shooting. This
framework allows the Committee to serve the vital role of
responding to specific problem areas.
143. Id. at art. 30(c).
144. Id. at art. 30(j).
145. Id. at art. 30(c).
146. Id. at art. 33(a). The Conference must also
fulfill all assignments requested by the Council. Id. at
art. 33(g).
147. Id. at art. 33(h). The Secretariat is the tech-
nical body of the Association. It is also charged with
representing the "regional" interest.
148. Id. at art. 33(b).
149. Id. at art. 33(c).
150. Id. at art. 33(d).
151. Id. at art. 33(f).
152. Id. at art. 33(e), 33(a).
153. Id. at art. 35(a)-(r).
The Committee represents LAIA before third party
nations.15 4 The Committee is empowered to undertake any
matter of common interest not delegated by the treaty to
another body. 15 5  It can also establish auxiliary bodies,
although it is not clear for what purposes.
15 6
The Committee performs an administrative function by
convening the Council and the Conference, when necessary.
The Committee can refer proposals to either body.15 7 It
is also charged with more mundane administrative tasks.
15 8
The Secretariat is the Association's technical and
administrative body. Its primary function is to formulate
proposals for achievement of the objectives of the associa-
tion. 15 9 In this context, the Secretariat is charged with
carrying out studies requested by other LAIA bodies.
1 60
It is also charged with assisting the governments of member
states to adopt agreements contemplated by the Treaty. 161
Most importantly for the future of integration, and
like the Andean Pact's "Junta," LAIA's Secretariat is
154. Id. at art. 35(i).
155. Id. at art. 35(r).
156. Id. at art. 35(p). Presumably the Committee can
create bodies that would address, either separately or in
conjunction with the Secretariat, particular regional
concerns. To the extent this is true it can serve as a
powerful force for integration.
157. Id. at arts. 35(h) and (k).
158. The Committee must approve the Association's
annual work program and budget to set the contributions of
the members and must also approve the structure of the
Secretariat. Id. at arts. 35(e), 35(f) and 35(g).
159. Id. at art. 38(a) and (c).
160. Id. at art. 38(b).
161. Id. at art. 38(c).
charged with representing the regional view. 162  The
Secretariat's advice must not champion the view of any
member state. 16 3  Indeed, LAIA members pledge to respect
the Secretariat's neutrality in this respect.
1 64
2. Treatment of the Less Developed Members
LAIA's structure avoids one of LAFTA's major
pitfalls: procedures for dealing with the lesser developed
members. The Association recognizes three groups of nations
according to their degree of development. 16 5  In so doing,
LAIA, unlike its predecessor, has adopted the advice of the
United Nations.
16 6
Chapter III addresses the treatment of the less devel-
oped members. The treaty mandates creation of favorable con-
ditions for the participation of the less developed coun-
tries (LDC's), based on "non-reciprocity and communitarian
principles." 16 7 This mandate is set forth in article 16
which requires the member countries to open their markets
and approve other programs of cooperation.
The more developed members are required to eliminate
custom and other restrictions on products (preferably indus-
trial products) originating in the LDC's. The members also
162. See notes 102 and 122 and accompanying text
supra. See also Riesenfeld, Legal Systems of
Regional Economic Integration, 22 AM. J. COMP. LAW 415,
417-18 (1974).
163. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124, at art.
40.
164. Id. at art. 41.
165. See Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124, at
art. 3(d). See also supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
166. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
167. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124 at art. 15.
See also supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
develop procedures to expand these "free trade" lists.
Where intraregional trade works to the detriment of LDC's,
the members should seek efficacious compensation mech-
anisms.
1 68
To assure regional cooperation, the more developed
members must negotiate "Special Programs of Cooperation"
with LDC's. 169 Members are also encouraged to establish
special programs of cooperation in financing, technology
and related areas. 17 0 This concern for LDC's is most
evident with regard to the favorable treatment given
land-locked Bolivia and Paraguay.
1 71
In this context, the Secretariat is required to
create an Economic Promotion Division for LDC's. After its
formulation, the Division shall obtain technical and
financial resources for the fulfillment of the promotion
program. The Division must also monitor the assistance
program for LDC's.
17 2
In addition to requiring a common regional tar-
iff, 17 3 the Treaty addresses agreements of regional and
174
partial scope. As noted above, negotiation of these
agreements as well as of the regional tariff preference is
the function of the Conference of Evaluation and Conver-
gence.1 7 5 These regional and partial agreements are
168. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124, at art.
18.
169. Id. at art. 20.
170. Id. at art. 21.
171. Id. at art. 22. Article 23 states "The member
countries shall endeavor to grant facilities for the estab-
lishment in their territories of free zones, deposit areas
or ports and other international transit administrative faci-
lities, in favor of the landlocked countries."
172. Id. at art. 38(1). Promotion programs refer to
agreements relating to non-tariff matters. Id. at art.
13.
173. See supra note 126.
174. See Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124, at
art. 4.
175. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying
text. 135
a focal point of the integration process. The system of sup-
port for less developed countries consists of both regional
and partial types of agreements. 17 6 To that extent they
are clearly mandatory. However, agreements of regional and
partial scope can address commerce, economic integration,
agriculture, the promotion of commerce, as well as other
matters. 17 7  In place of LAFTA's emphasis on yearly rounds
of product negotiations, LAIA emphasizes multilateral
agreements on matters of interest. The new attitude among
LAIA's promoters is a flexible one.
17 8
Chapter VII provides that the advantages, favors,
rights, immunities and privileges members enjoy by agree-
ment with another member or a non-member but which are not
granted the Treaty creating LAIA or the Andean Pact, shall
be extended unconditionally to all other members.
17 9
No discrimination is allowed in matters of tax,
charges, 18 0 internal duties or investment capital orig-
inating in member states. 1 81 Moreover, goods imported or
exported by member countries shall enjoy freedom of transit
in the territories of other member countries.
1 8 2
Concerning products that come within the regional tariff
preference not produced or produced in insubstantial
quantities in their own territory, members are admonished
to avoid erosion of benefits obtained through negotiations
by application of internal taxes or other measures.
18 3
176. See supra notes 165-172 and accompanying text.
See also Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124, at art.
18-23.
177. Id. at art. 6, 8.
178. Id. at art. 3(d).
179. Id. at art. 44.
180. Id. at art. 46.
181. Id. at art. 48.
182. Id. at art. 51.
183. Id. at art. 47.
Members may establish complementary norms of commerce which
regulate matters such as application of nontariff barriers,
rules of origin and export incentive measures. 184
Members may withdraw from the Association. To do so
they must communicate this intention to the other members
during a session of the Committee. One year later, the
member state must present a formal document of denuncia-
tion. At that time, the member's rights and obligations
automatically cease. However, the rights and obligations
arising from the regional tariff preference remain effec-
tive for five years unless the member states agree to the
contrary at the time of renunciation. 185
IV. SAFE HARBORS
The Agreement of Cartagena, establishing the Andean
Group, 1 8 6 in effect mandates the exclusion of the prop-
erty interests of U.S. and Canadian based firms from the
instability and uncertainty characterizing expropria-
tion. 1 8 7 This mandate was fulfilled by adoption of the
Common Regime for Treatment of Foreign Investments, Trade-
marks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties in December of 1970
and ratified as Decision 24 on June 1, 1971.188
184. Id. at art. 49.
185. Id. at art. 63.
186. See supra note 97.
187. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 124, at arts.
2, 26, 27.
188. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, (Adopted Dec.
31, 1970 by the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement,
amended as of November 30, 1976) reprinted in 16 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 138 (1977) [hereinafter Andean Foreign
Investment Code].
A. Foreign Investment
The Andean Foreign Investment Code addresses a
market in excess of 50 million people in an area half as
large as the United States. 189 The Code's preamble
recites ideals of foreign investment quite similar to those
first enunciated by Punta del Este and the Declaration of
Bogota: 1 90 "foreign capital and technology can play an
important part in subregional development ... to the extent
that it constitutes an effective contribution toward
attaining the objectives of integration and reaching the
goals indicated in national development plans." 1 91 This
theory is an extension of the realization that integration
will require foreign investment which in turn must be able
to incur risks. Consequently, it is necessary to promul-
gate rules setting out not only the advantages of integra-
tion benefitting national or mixed firms, 1 92 but also the
rights and obligations of foreign investors, such as guar-
antees of protection. The regime must work for the mutual
benefit of both the investor and the member countries.
1 93
The Code is not simply a set of rules regulating
foreign investment. Rather, it is a general set of guide-
lines imposing affirmative obligations on all member
states. The goal is clearly to strengthen national firms
189. Schliesser, Restrictions on Foreign Investment
in the Andean Common Market, 5 INT'L LAW. 586 (1971).
190. See supra note 85.
191. Andean Foreign Investment Code supra note
188, at 139.
192. Id. The Code refers to a national competent
authority, which is the policy body in each member state
which is responsible for implementing the provisos of the
Code within its territory.
193. See Treaty of Montevideo supra note 124, at
art. 3.
to enable them to participate in overall development.
19 4
Likewise, the Code imposes a general obligation upon aember
states to implement standards and mechanisms which will
attract needed technology to national enterprises on reason-
195
able terms, and allow national capital to participate
in existing enterprises. In this manner, the Code places
development in national hands.
1 96
Definitions provided by the Code apply not only to
regulation of foreign investment but also to other common
regimes promulgated pursuant to mandate of Decision 24.
A "direct foreign investment"1 97 is defined broadly as a
contribution made by a natural or juridical person to the
capital of an enterprise either in freely convertible
currency or through industrial plants, new or used
machinery, spare parts, raw materials or intermediate
products. The definition of "direct foreign investment"
also includes funds in local currencies. 198 These funds
may be transferred abroad and reinvested.
"National investors "1 99 are defined as the state,
national individual, national non-profit entities and
national enterprises. A foreigner can become a national
investor by establishing residency of at least one year, and
by appearing before the national competent authority to
renounce his or her right to repatriate capital and to
transfer profits abroad. An investment made by a
subregional investor will be considered equivalent to a
national investment if the investment was authorized by the
investor's country of
194. Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 188
at art. 5.
195. Id. at art. 6.
196. Id. at art. 7.
197. Id. at art. l(a).
198. Id. at Annex 162 I-II(b).
199. Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 188,
at I(b). 139
origin and is submitted for prior approval of the host
(which requires certification of the country of origin). A
subregional investor is a national investor of a member
country other than the host, 20 0 whereas a foreign inves-
tor is defined as a national of a non-member country and
owns a direct investment in a member state.
20 1
A "national enterprise, " 202 is an enterprise which
is organized in the recipient country and is controlled by
at least 80% national investors. There is a proviso to
ensure compliance, which demands that the 80% ownership be
reflected in the technical, financial, administrative and
commercial management of the enterprises.
The capital of a "mixed enterprise "20 3 belongs to
national investors in a proportion which may fluctuate
between 51% and 80% if the national competent authority
determines whether the proportion correctly reflects the
actual management.
In a "foreign enterprise, " 20 4 less than 51% of the
capital is owned by national investors. Even if national
investors hold greater than 51% of the capital of a "for-
eign enterprise", a national competent authority may decide
that the management does not reflect domestic control.
The Code further defines and characterizes invest-
ments. Thus, a "new investment" 2 05 is one made after
200. Id. at art. (c).
201. Id. at art. (d).
202. Id. at art. (e).
203. Id. at art. l(f). The Commission of the
Cartagena Agreement through Decision 110 is responsible for
deciding the treatment to be accorded investments of mixed
enterprises.
204. Id. at art. (g).
205. Id. at art. (h).
July 1, 1971 in existing or new enterprises. "Reinvest-
ments" 2 06 are investments of all or part of undistributed
profits.
The dependista antagonism to foreign investment has
previously been noted above. One such conflict involves
the ability of foreign investors, especially trans-
nationals, to affect important developmental policy.
Addressing this concern, the Code requires that any foreign
investor wishing to invest in an Andean country submit an
application to the national competent authority (NCA). The
NCA must then process the application, considering the
country's development policy. The application will be
approved if it is deemed consistent with the national
interest. 207 No member state may approve an investment
in an activity already covered by an existing industry.
Moreover, no member state may approve an investment the
purpose of which is to acquire shares, participation, or
rights owned by national or subregional investors.
208
The NCA is empowered to authorize foreign participation
in national or mixed firms if the capital of the
respective enterprise is increased and the enterprise
maintains mixed classification. 209
The Code considers reinvestments to be new invest-
ments, and requires authorization and registration. 210
206. Id. at art. (i). Art. (j) added to the Code by
art. 33 of Decision 70. See 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 349
(1973).
207. See Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra
note 188, at art. 2. See Appendix II--a list of
information required for the assessment.
208. Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 188
at art. 3. This proviso was intended to address the
practice of foreign acquisition of domestic firms.
209. Id. at art. 4.
210. Id. at art. 12.
However, the Andean governments may permit reinvestment of
profits as long as they do not exceed 7% of the company's
capital. 2 11  No authorization is required for amounts up
to 7%. Registration, however, is required.
21 2
Another means used to circumvent the reinvestment
structure of article 12 is the application of undistributed
earnings to the acquisition of Portfolio Development Bonds
when reinvested earnings and these bonds do not exceed 7%
of the company's capital. Registration is required for the
acquisition of these bonds.
213
The NCA must examine and approve all contracts which
concern importation of technology, patents or trademarks.
It is charged with appraising the effective contribution of
the goods in which the technology is incorporated or with
applying any other standard it deems appropriate for meas-
uring the effects of the imported technology.
21 4
Chapter III addresses special regulation by sectors.
Each state must determine which sectors of economic
activity will be reserved for national public or private
enterprises. The State must also determine whether mixed
enterprises will be admitted. The Commission, upon
recommendation of the Board, may determine the sectors
which all states shall reserve for national or private
enterprises. The Commission also decides whether
participation of mixed enterprises will be allowed.
21 5
211. The amount was increased from 5% to 7% after Chile
protested. See infra notes 253-286 and accompanying text.
212. Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra, note 188 at
art. 12.
213. Id. at art. (j), added to the Code by art. 33
of Decision 70. See 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 349 (1973).
The required registration is a title or obligation issued
for developmental purposes and publicly offered by the
state, a state entity, quasi state entities, national or
mixed firms or by the Andean Development Corporation.
214. Andean Foreign Investment Code supra, note 188,
at art. 18.
215. Id. at ch. III, art. 38.
Foreign firms in these special sectors shall not be
obligated to abide by the provisions of Chapter III
regarding their transformation into mixed or national
firms. They are subject to the other provisions and to
articles 40 and 43.216
During the first 20 years of the Code's existence,
foreign firms engaged in the basic products sector (subject
to concessions) will not be required to transform so long
as their contracts do not exceed 20 years. 217 Depletion
tax allowances are not allowed for basic products sector
activity. The preferable form for foreign participation
here are contracts of association with the State.
Upon authorization by the NCA, the owner of a direct
foreign investment has the right to transfer abroad in
freely convertible currency, the verified net profits
resulting from the direct foreign investments. Transfer in
excess of 20% annually is prohibited. However, member
countries may authorize greater percentages so long as the
Commission is notified. The NCA may also authorize the
investment of excess distributed earnings, in which case
such investments shall be considered direct foreign
investments. No new investments are permitted in the
218
public service sector. The only exemption are those
investments made to ensure the technical and economic
efficiency of currently existing firms.
2 19
216. Id. at art. 39.
217. Id. at art. 40. "[Tlhe basic products sector
is [defined as] ... exploration and exploitation of any
minerals, of any kind, including liquid and gaseous
hydrocarbons, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, and
exploitation of forests. For Bolivia and Ecuador this
sector also includes primary agricultural and livestock
activities."
218. New investments are defined in the Code as
"drinking water, sewers, electric power and lighting,
cleaning and sanitary, telephone, postal and telecommu-
nications services." Id.
219. Id. at art. 41.
The code proscribes direct foreign investment in insur-
ance, commercial banking and other financial institutions.
Foreign banks in existence in member states had three years
from the Code's effective date to cease receipt of local
deposits in current accounts, savings accounts or time
accounts. These banks could only stay in business if they
converted into national enterprises, 220 which entails
selling 80% of their capital to national investors within
the three year period.
The Code mandates that no "new direct foreign invest-
ment [is] permitted in domestic transportation enterprises,
advertising enterprises, commercial radio stations, tel-
evision stations, newspapers, magazines, or enterprises
engaged in domestic marketing of products of any kind."
Further, foreign firms already "in these sectors must also
convert into national enterprises."
22 1
The sanctions for noncompliance, or for situations
when a host country does not grant exemption from these pro-
visions provide that the products are not permitted duty-
free status under the Cartagena Agreement."
22 2
Pursuant to the goal of maintaining local control of
economic policy, the Code requires an investor to register
the agreement reached with the NCA. The agreement must
specify the terms of authorization. A further required
stipulation is the amount of the investment which will be
registered in freely convertible currency.
2 2 3
The host country registering the investment must also
supervise fulfillment of the Code. Other Code provisions
require the NCA to "(1) supervise fulfillment of commitments
220. Id. at art. 42.
221. Id. at art. 43.
222. Id. at art. 44.
223. Id. at art. 5.
commitments for national participation in the enterprises,
technical, administrative, financial and commercial manage-
ment and in its capital" [structure]; 22 4 "(2) authorize
in exceptional cases the purchase of shares,
participations, or rights of national or mixed enterprises
by foreign investors, in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 3 and 4;22 5 (3) establish an information and
price control system of the intermediate products that may
be furnished by suppliers of foreign technology or
capital." "(4) authorize the transfer abroad ... of all
amounts [authorized by the Code or by national law],
centralize statistical accounting ... and supervisory
records connected with direct foreign investments; and
authorize licensing contracts for the use of imported
technology, trademarks and patents."226
Only national or mixed firms or foreign firms which
transform into national or mixed firms can enjoy "[t]he
advantages deriv[ed] from the duty free program of the
Cartagena Agreement. " 227 To avail itself of the program,
a foreign firm must, within three years of the regime's
effective date, register to divest itself. After three
years, there must be national investor participation of not
less than 15%. Time periods for divestment range from a
maximum of 15 years in Colombia, Peru and Venezuela to a
maximum of 20 years in Bolivia and Ecuador, beginning on
January 1, 1974. The divestment program contemplates that
a passage of two-thirds of the time period will bring about
224. The purpose of this structure is to assure the
host government that a minority foreign shareholder of a
fragmented entity shall not control the enterprise.
225. See supra note 41.
226. Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra, note
188, art. 6.
227. Id. at art. 27.
a percentage of national investors in firms at not less
than 45%. 228 Foreign firms established after July 1,
1971 must agree to place on sale, according to article 31,
a specified percentage of shares so that they are trans-
formed in compliance with the program.
229
Only firms which indicate within the three year period
their willingness to transform, will be granted certifi-
cates of origin of merchandise by the national authority
responsible for it. 2 30  Foreign firm fade-out agreements
must stipulate certain matters. 2 31 During the period
228. Id. at art. 28.
229. Id. at art. 30. In Colombia, Chile and Peru
the agreement must stipulate participation by national
investors in the following percentages:
Fifteen percent at the beginning of production,
thirty percent upon completion of one-third of
time period, no less than forty-five percent
after two-thirds of the time period.
In Bolivia and Ecuador, five percent upon com-
pletion of three years of production, no less
than ten percent upon completion of one-third of
the time period and no less than thirty-five
percent after two-thirds of the time period.,
In all states other than Ecuador and Bolivia,
the twenty year period commences two years after
production begins.
230. Id. at art. 29. The certificates, by speci-
fying that the firm is a participant in the Andean Group,
act as a license exempting the products from payment of
duties.
231. Id. at art. 31. The required items which
must be stipulated include:
(a) The period of time for compliance with
the obligation to transform the foreign
enterprise into a mixed enterprise;
(b) The gradual scale for the transfer of
shares, participations, or rights to national
investors
(c) Regulations that will ensure the progres-
sive participation of national investors or
their representatives in the technical, finan-
cial, commercial, and administrative manage-
ment of the enterprise, at least as of the
date on which the enterprise begins product-
ion;
a percentage of national investors in firms at not less
than 45%. 22 8  Foreign firms established after July 1,
1971 must agree to place on sale, according to article 31,
a specified percentage of shares so that they are trans-
229
formed in compliance with the program.
Only firms which indicate within the three year period
their willingness to transform, will be granted certifi-
cates of origin of merchandise by the national authority
responsible for it. 2 30  Foreign firm fade-out agreements
must stipulate certain matters. 231 During the period
228. Id. at art. 28.
229. Id. at art. 30. In Colombia, Chile and Peru
the agreement must stipulate participation by national
investors in the following percentages:
Fifteen percent at the beginning of production,
thirty percent upon completion of one-third of
time period, no less than forty-five percent
after two-thirds of the time period.
In Bolivia and Ecuador, five percent upon com-
pletion of three years of production, no less
than ten percent upon completion of one-third of
the time period and no less than thirty-five
percent after two-thirds of the time period.
In all states other than Ecuador and Bolivia,
the twenty year period commences two years after
production begins.
230. Id. at art. 29. The certificates, by speci-
fying that the firm is a participant in the Andean Group,
act as a license exempting the products from payment of
duties.
231. Id. at art. 31. The required items which
must be stipulated include:
(a) The period of time for compliance with
the obligation to transform the foreign
enterprise into a mixed enterprise;
(b) The gradual scale for the transfer of
shares, participations, or rights to national
investors
(c) Regulations that will ensure the progres-
sive participation of national investors or
their representatives in the technical, finan-
cial, commercial, and administrative manage-
ment of the enterprise, at least as of the
date on which the enterprise begins product-
ion;
of transformation, foreign firms will enjoy the advantages
of the duty free program. However, any breach of their
agreement effectively terminates such benefits. 2 32 The
NCA controls the fade-out obligations and the manner of
sale. 233 The rights granted by the Code are the maximum
which can be granted, 23 4 though each state can impose
stricter requirements.
A foreign firm which exports 80% or more of its prod-
ucts into third countries "shall not be obligated to abide
by the provisions of the [Code]." Of course, it cannot
participate in the duty free program established by the
Agreement. 235
Upon authorization by the NCA, "the owners of a direct
foreign investment can transfer abroad in freely converti-
ble currency, the verified net profits resulting from the
direct foreign investment, as long as it is not in excess
of 20% of that investment annually." A member state can
authorize a greater percentage but must communicate this to
the Commission.
2 36
A registered investor can repatriate invested capital
when shares are sold to national or subregional investors
(d) The method of determining value of the
shares, participations, or rights at the
time of their sale; and
(e) The systems that will ensure the trans-
fer of shares, participations or rights to
national investors.
Id.
232. Id. at art. 32.
233. Id. at art. 35. See also art. 36. As long
as the State has a determining voice in decision making, an
enterprise can be styled mixed even if less than 51%
capital is national. The Commission or Board recommenda-
tion must "establish minimum percentage of participation of
the State or State enterprises ... within three months
after the regime's effective date."
234. Id. at art. 33.
235. Id. at art. 34.
236. Id. at art. 37.
or upon reinvestment. However, sale of shares to another
foreign firm must be authorized and will not be considered
for re-exportation of capital. 2 37 The Code defines "re-
exportable capital" as the original investment registered
and actually made, plus any reinvestments made in the same
enterprise in accordance with the provisions of the Code
minus any net losses.
2 38
Upon liquidation, "the difference between the real
value of the net assets and the re-exportable capital, as
defined [above is] considered as capital gain and may be
transferred abroad after payment of ... taxes."
2 39
Following payment of taxes, a foreign investor acquires the
right to transfer abroad amounts obtained from the sale of
shares or other rights. 2 40 Conversion is at the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time the draft is drawn. 241
"Transfers abroad made by enterprises covering
amortization or interest because of the use of foreign
credits shall be authorized in accordance with terms of the
registered contract."24 2 Foreign credit agreements
between a parent and its subsidiary may not have a rate of
interest which exceeds by more than three points the
interest rate of first class securities prevailing in the
financial market of the country of origin of the currency
in which the transaction is registered. 24 3 The NCA must
determine the rate of interest for any other external
credit contract.
237. Id. at art. 7.
238. Id. at art. 8.
239. Id. at art. 9.
240. Id. at art. 10.
241. Id. at art. 11.
242. Id.
243. Real rate of interest may be defined as "the
total that must be paid by the debtor for the use of the
credit -- including commissions and expenses of any kind."
Id.
Nevertheless, the rate of interest must be closely related
to the prevailing conditions of the financial market of the
country in which the transaction has been registered.
The Code closes one large loophole involving profit
remittance, by allowing intangible technological contribu-
tions the right to payment of royalties upon authorization
by the NCA. However, they may not be computed as capital
contributions. If furnished to a foreign enterprise by its
parent or an affiliate, no payment of royalties is auth-
244
orized and no deduction is allowed for tax purposes.
The Code also addresses imports of foreign tech-
nology. Contracts for the importation of technology must
contain clauses identifying terms of transfer and stating
the value assigned in the contract to the various com-
ponents of the technology. The values must be expressed in
a form similar to that followed in the registration of
direct foreign investments. 245 Any contract containing
anticompetitive clauses is automatically denied authoriza-
tion.2 46 Clauses of this nature are not accepted in
connection with subregional trade or export of similar
products to third parties.
24 7
NCAs are responsible for knowing about the available
technology on the world market in order to have alternative
244. Id. at art. 21.
245. Id. at art. 19.
246. Id. at art. 20. These include, inter alia,
clauses (1) tying the technology to permanent use of par-
ticular personnel, raw materials, products or other (spe-
cific source) technology, (2) fixing prices of finished
product, (c) restricting volume and structure of production,
(d) prohibiting use of competing technology, (3) obligating
purchaser to transfer improvements to supplier, and (f)
"clauses of similar effect." An exception exists when the
NCA decides to limit the manufacture of these products.
247. Id.
solutions to recommend to the Board for subregional develop-
ment. 248 Preference is given products incorporating
indigenous technology. Based upon Board recommendation,
the Commission may propose to member countries the estab-
lishment of charges for products using trademarks of
foreign origin. These trademarks include those for which
royalties must be paid or those for which easily accessible
technology may be used in production.
24 9
The Code requires the Commission to formulate a pro-
gram to promote subregional technology before November 30,
1972, and prohibits the use of restrictive covenants.
2 50
At the Board's proposal, the Commission may specify
productive processes or groups of products for which no
patent privilege may be granted in any of the member coun-
tries. The Commission may also revise previously granted
privileges. 251
248. Id. at art. 22.
249. Id. at art. 24.
250. Id. at art. 25. Restrictive covenants include,
but are not limited to, prohibition or limitation on the
export or sale in certain countries of products manufactured
under the trademark concerned, tying arrangements, and price
fixing.
251. Id. at art. 26. Article 54 further requires
member states
to establish a Sub-regional Industrial
Property Office which shall have the fol-
lowing functions:
(a) To serve as liaison between the
national industrial property offices;
(b) To compile information on industrial
property and distribute it to the national
offices;
(c) To prepare model licensing contracts
for the use of trademarks and patents in the
Sub-region;
(d) To advise national offices on all matters
connected with the implementation of common
regulations on industrial property
As noted above, the Code imposes upon member states an
affirmative obligation to follow a prescribed course of
conduct. Consequently, the system has experienced internal
dissension. An example of this dissension occurred in 1976
when Chile insisted on a revision of the Code. The
controversy briefly sketched below illustrates how potential
conflicts can arise intraregionally, and why the Code was
adopted. 252
B. Dissension and Modification
Prior to the incorporation of the Code into the
Chilean legal order, the regulation of foreign investment
was characterized by an absence of a unified developmental
policy: "The preceding legal order sought to formalize
rather than to regulate. The restrictions on foreign invest-
ments aimed at safeguarding the financial integrity of the
transactions rather than at furthering specific development
objectives. ,,253
Chile was a party to the Agreement of Cartagena when
Eduardo Frei was President. The Code was incorporated
(e) To carry out studies and to submit
recommendations to the Member Countries on
invention patents.
Article 55 states that "[u]pon the recommendation of the
Board, the Commission shall establish a subregional system
for the development, promotion, production and adaptation
of technology.... " For a more detailed discussion of the
Code see generally Valdez, The Andean Foreign Invest-
ment Code, An Analysis, J. INT'L L. ECON. 1 (1972); Fouts,
The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 10 TEX. INT'L. L.J.
537 (1975); Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Regime for
Foreign Investments, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 313 (1972);
Darino, The Andean Code After Five Years, 8 LAW. AM. 635
(1976).
252. Comment, Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common
Market Regulation of Foreign Investment, 16 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 138, 149 (1977).
253. Id. at 150.
into Chilean law by Decree Law 482 of the Chilean Ministry
of Foreign Relations in June of 1971. The decree
established the Code's operating mechanisms and abrogated
any inconsistent law.
2 5 4
Frei was succeeded in office by Salvador Allende, who
had expressed agreement with the Code. The ouster of
Allende's regime in September of 1973, proved that the Code
could not provide solutions to many of Chile's grave
economic problems at the time, "... accentuated by a
world-wide drop in copper." 25 5 Chilean society
desperately needed to curtail inflation and accelerate
growth. On July 13, 1974, Chile enacted Decree Law
600256 to attract foreign capital.
The initial confrontation with the Andean Group
occurred at the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the Cartagena
257
Agreement on September 10-12, 1974. At this session,
member states were negotiating a tariff-reduction schedule.
254. Id. at 151. See also Casanova, Annotaciones
a la applicacion de la Decision, No. 24: El Caso de
Chile (Notes on the application of Decision 24: The
Chilean Case). 15 D.D.L.I. 239 (1974).
255. See Chile: Decree Law 600, 13 INT'L. L.
MATERIALS 1176 (1974). "Once accelerated growth has become
the primary objective of development policy, the implementa-
tion of certain economic policies and structures within the
capitalist model is largely preordained. In particular, it
becomes obvious that foreign capital and technology must per-
form a central function within the developing nation."
Comment, supra note 252, at 152.
256. "Chile has refused to discuss any other pressing
issues until the matter of foreign capital treatment is
resolved ... [it] has proposed the total elimination of the
fade-out provision, particularly for international companies
that operate only locally and do not desire to take
advantage of AnCom benefits .... All members with the
exception of Chile adamantly refuse to lift the prohibition
on the capitalization of technology." 1976 BUS. LATIN AM.,
AnCom is Pressured to Focus Attention on D.24 Issue, 217,
218.
257. Comment, supra note 252, at 156.
"The presentation of a joint declaration by Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela signified the end of the
session stated. The declaration formally announced that
Chilean Decree Law 600 contravened the Cartagena Agreement
in its spirit and philosophy and constituted a parallel
regime ... which has internationally generated expectations
contrary to the subregional interest.
"2 58
Proponents of Andean economic integration feared that
Chilean Decree Law 600259 would create pressure within the
other member states to attract foreign capital, contrary to
interests of the integration movement. They also felt that
only a collective effort would enable foreign capital to
respond to regional needs. The Chilean position was based
on the principle that Andean Group measures are national law
to the extent that they are consistent with national
needs. 260 The Chilean's action also showed that although
Andean measures were supreme, they could be ignored when
special circumstances affect national interests.
The Andean members pointed out that Decree Law 600
had no fade-out provision, that the limitation on profit
258. For a detailed account of the controversy, see
G. Amador, The Andean Legal Order 1-44 (1978).
259. See notes 77-116 and accompanying text supra.
260. As originally promulgated D.L. 600 was quite favor-
able to foreign investors. It established a Foreign Invest-
ment Committee with which foreign investors were to nego-
tiate contracts. The terms of the contracts were to be
freely negotiated between the parties. Article 5 guaran-
teed nondiscrimination between foreign and national capital.
Article 6 grants a right to petition when the investor feels
a provision has discriminated against him.
Chapter V provides for a compensation scheme for
foreigners who have suffered damage due to a discriminatory
provision. The rules regarding remittances of profits,
taxation, etc. are also more liberal.
remittances were excluded, that it did not limit access to
credit, and favored foreign investors.
26 1
A resolution was adopted at the Sixteenth Ordinary
Session of the Cartagena Agreement. Decree Law 600 was
effectively limited to Articles 34 and 44 of the Code.
2 62
However, Chile found that "it could not eliminate inves-
tors' doubts ... lack of investor confidence, exacerbated
by uncertainty as to the outcome of the clash with [Deci-
sion 241, transformed the promise of [Decree Law] 600 into
an illusion.
" 263
During the summer of 1976, Chile intensified its
attack on Decision 24; refusing to approve revision of the
tariff reduction schedule. 26 4 At this juncture, the
member states were willing to meet some of Chile's
demands. 26 5 The member states agreed to a protocol
establishing a special commission between Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela and Chile. 266
The protocol sought a complete resolution of the crisis.
Article 2 of the protocol provided, however, that:
Articles 3 and 19 of D.L. 600 attempted to incorporate
Chile's obligations to foreign investors under LAFTA and
the Agreement. Under art. 19, to be entitled to share in
the benefits of LAFTA and AnCom, a foreign investor must
comply with D.L. 600 and all those other resolutions and
decisions arising out of said international commitments.
261. Art. 34 exempts enterprises exporting 80% or more
of their production outside the common market area.
Articles 41-44 allow exemptions but entail loss of the trade
benefits.
262. Comment, supra note 252, at 167.
263. See supra note 256.
264. These modifications included: (1) raising the
remittance level to 20% and giving the member an option to
raise the limit further, (2) raising the limit on reinvested
profits from 5% to 7%, (3) using increasing capitalization
to fade out foreign firms, (4) granting of medium term
credits.
265. See supra note 258, at 11 (Protocol of Oct.
5).
266. Id. at 12.
if by the completion of the period indicated in
the preceding article [twenty-four days from the
protocol's effective date] an agreement between
the parties should not be reached, then they
agree, by virtue of this agreement to Chile's with-
drawal from the Cartagena Agreement, renouncing
all its rights and ending its obligations derived
from that Agreement ... except the rights and
obligations emanating from Decisions.40, 4617 56
and 94 which shall remain fully in force. 267
Chile was adamant in its position and could not be
placated. At the Seventh Ordinary Session, the Commission
of the Cartagena Agreement adopted Decision 102, giving
effect to the protocol of October 5, and creating a
committee to study the way unaffected laws were to be
implemented. 268
Chile's actions had a profound influence on the char-
acter of the Code. During October 30, 1976, the Commis-
sion approved reforms to the Code. Additional reforms were
approved from November 25 to 30, 1976.269 The reforms
as a whole were extensive.
Prior to the reform, investors who had established a
one year residency and renounced repatriation were con-
sidered national investors. 270 Currently, one or both of
these conditions may be waived. 271
267. Decisi6n 102: Cessation for Chile of the
Rights and Obligations derived from the Agreement of
Cartagena, 24 D.D.L.I. 163 (1977).
268. See id. Decision 103 at 164, Decision 109 at
165 and Decision 110 at 166. See also Ancom Modifica-
tion of D.24 Turns Out Quite Extensive (inter alia) 1976
BUS. LATIN AM. 292. "The principal changes involve the
profit remittance ceiling based on registered capital and
the ceiling on reinvestment for purposes of increasing the
base that are automatic without official approval. The
former goes from 14% to 20% member countries having an
option to make it higher.... Moreover, governments would
be free to permit any portion over 20% to be reinvested.
The 5% ceiling for automatic reinvestment would go to 7%."
269. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
270. See generally Decision 103, art. 1; Chaparro,
Las reformas al Regimen Andino de Inversiones Extran-
jeras. (Reforms to the Andean Regime of Foreign Invest-
ments) 24 D.D.L.I. 133 (1977).
271. Id. Decision 103, art. 1 and art. 4.
The reform also created a new class of investor, the
subregional investor. The subregional investor enjoys the
right to repatriate capital and remit profits but is con-
sidered a national investor for purposes of the Code. To
be considered a subregional investor, a foreign investor
must receive authorization from the country of origin and
272
the receptor country. No subregional investments may
be authorized for industries producing products reserved to
other member countries.
27 3
Another reform opens up medium term credit of three
years or less 27 4 to foreign investors. This reform also
refers determination of the terms and conditions under
which short and medium credit must be granted to foreign
firms to national decisionmakers.
27 5
The Code required a foreign investor, who wanted to
participate in a national or mixed enterprise to meet two
conditions. First, the investor had to increase the
capital of the enterprise,and second, it could not alter
the nature of the enterprise invested in. The reform
requires that the recipient maintain its quality as a mixed
firm, but does not affect its obligation to increase
capital. Thus, the investor is given a wider choice of
methods. 276
The reform also addresses investment of excess
profits. The low percentage limits imposed on these
profits created an anomalous situation, the accumulation
272. See art. 32 and 55 (Industrial Programming
section of the Agreement).
273. Prior legislation only permitted short-term
credit subject to terms and conditions imposed by the
Commission, see art. 17 of the Code and art. 6 of
Decision 103.
274. See supra note 268, Decision 103, art. 6.
275. Id. at art. 3.
276. See Chaparro, supra note 270, at 135.
Decision 103, art. 10.
of resources belonging to foreign investors without right
of convertibility or right of repatriation. They fit
neither the definition of direct investment nor national
investment because of the nationality of the owners. The
reform
included a new provision with which governments
could authorize investment of the excess of the
annual profits produced by foreign investment.
The norm requires that [the subject matter] be
profits distributed to ... investors ... Once
authorized as investment of [excess profit] they
are converted to foreign direct investment with
the privileges inherent to these.2 77
When the original Code was promulgated, the require-
ment that foreign firms fade out was contingent upon the
agreement entering into force simultaneously on July 1,
1971. However, Venezuela did not adopt the Code until
1974, and there were questions as to its constitutionality
in Colombia. The Commission decided to promote uniformity
in transformation by specifying that January 1, 1974 would-
be the date on which transformations were to begin. 278
Further, the reform established the possibility of
achieving this transformation through capital increase of
the enterprise.279 The reform also established that the
investments of international financial entities and foreign
governmental agencies of developmental cooperation could
qualify as neutral.
280
277. See supra note 268, Decision 103, art. 7.
278. Id. at art. 8.
279. Id. at art. 11.
280. "Despite specific areas of concern, ... execu-
tives surveyed generally have a high regard for Chile's
economic performance and the policies that brought about
recovery.... For manufactures, Chile's main handicap is the
modest size of the market.... Another element ... is the
country's liberal tariff policies .... Cheap duties benefit
foreign investors by ridding the economy of inefficient
Since Chile's departure from the Andean Group, the
country has experienced hardship. 281 The other
Andean states continue to work under the regime in one manner
or another.
28 2
One member state, Venezuela, deserves brief mention.
Venezuela's decision to join the Andean Group was announced
by President Caldera in 1973. This decision is noteworthy
because prevalent Venezuelan opinion in the early 60's
held that, "any common market or free trade area will leave
us producing nothing but petroleum and iron ore, and
importing everything else. Our textiles cannot compete
with Brazilian textiles, our coffee cannot compete with
Colombian coffee and our meat cannot compete with Uruguayan
meat."2 8 3 By 1972, this attitude changed: "[iut had
become apparent to many of the nation's decision makers
that participation in these organizations was essential if
Venezuela were to
producers .... At the same time however, low duties provide
international corporations with a very persuasive argument to
service the Chilean market from abroad, rather than setting up
operations inside the country." Investing in Chile: Cor-
porate Survey Reveals Pros and Cons. 1978 BUS. LATIN AM.
1362.
281. Space limitations prohibit a country-by-country
analysis of major policy variance. In Colombia, the Code
as well as the Cartagena Agreement was subjected to
constitutional attack. See Acuerdo de Cartagena: Su
constitucionalidad y la de Decision No. 24 en Colombia.
(The Cartagena Agreement: Its constitutionality and that
of Decision 24 in Regulation of the Andean Investment
Code: Colombia 4 LAW. AM. 15 (1972); Peru: see Decree
Law 18, 350 on the Law of Industries (July 17, 1970), 9
INT'L L. MATERIALS 1125 (1970). As to non-Andean LAFTA
members see Argentina: Stebbings, The Argentine Foreign
Investment Law and its Andean Common Market Inspiration, 8
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 280 (1975).
282. Statement by an official of the Bank of
Venezuela, Banco de Venezuela, Boletin de Economias y
Financias, Sept. 1960.
283. Carl & Johnson, Venezuela and the Andean Common
Market, 7 DEN. J. INT'L. L. POL'Y. 151, 154 (1978). The
article focuses on the changes in internal law effected by
Chile upon joining the Andean Common Market.
continue its economic growth and to avoid exclusion from
important trading markets. "2 84 Venezuela had little
difficulty accepting the underlying philosophy of the Code.
285
By 1971, Venezuela's national legislation had already
incorporated many of the basic concepts of the Code. By
1974, Venezuela had fulfilled the steps required to bring
it into the Andean fold.
28 6
C. Emerging Antitrust Concepts
During their Sixteenth Extraordinary Session, the
Commission of the Agreement of Cartagena approved Decision
45 regarding regulation of competition. 28 7 The decision
was made pursuant to the mandate of Chapter III of the
Agreement imposing a duty to harmonize laws. Correcting
practices that distort competition comes within the mandate
since the liberalization program of the Agreement is
designed to make available to subregional consumers a
growing volume of goods produced within the subregion in
conditions of increasingly favorable price and quality.
28 8
284. "... As outlined by the subcommittee, the working
paper apparently reflects private-sector apprehensions
about steering away foreign investors, but manages to blend
in some ideas that seem close to AnCom's restrictive rules
." Venezuela's Proposed Investment Law Shows Influence
of AnCom Regulations, 1972 BUS. LATIN AM. 71.
285. See Andean Commission -- Venezuela -- Final Act
of the Negotiations on the Entry of Venezuela into the
Cartagena Agreement (Lima, Feb. 13, 1973) in 12 INT'L.
LEGAL MATERIALS 344 (1973); Venezuela Decrees Concerning
the Regulation of Foreign Investment in Accordance with
Decisions of the Andean Pact (Decree No. 62 - April 28,
1974) and Regulation Governing Common Treatment of Foreign
Capital, Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties
Approved by Decisions No. 24, 37, 37A and 70 of the Commis-
sion of the Agreement of Cartagena (Decree No. 63), 13
INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 1220 (1974).
286. Acuerdo de Cartagena -- Normas sobre Competencia,
10 D.D.L.I. 1953 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Acuerdo de
Cartagena].
287. Id. at 196.
288. From the wording of the statute, it does not appear
that all such price manipulations is proscribed. The word
"indebido" is used. This word means "unnecessary." Hence a
rule of reason might be applicable.
The decision establishes per se violations. They
are dumping, price manipulation, 28 9 conduct which
influences the normal flow of primary materials
29 0
as well well as any other conduct having equivalent
effect. 291
Any member state which is aggrieved by the conduct of
any other member state may present its case to the
"Junta," 29 2 together with the facts giving rise to the
claim.2 9 3 The "Junta" must solicit information on the
matter from the offending state within forty-eight hours.
This information must be returned to the "Junta" within
fifteen days. The "Junta" is empowered to take any measure
necessary, to resolve the conflict.
29 4
If the parties do not arrive at a solution, the
"Junta" may order implementation of corrective measures.
Within thirty days of the time period in article 4, the
"Junta" is required to expedite the corresponding
resolution. 295 The resolution is then communicated to
the interested parties, to the other member states and to
the Commission at its next meeting.296, 297
289. This apparently encompasses agreements to limit
production or sale.
290. Acuerdo de Cartagena, supra note 286, at art. 2.
291. The "Junta" is the technical branch of the Carta-
gena Agreement responsible for representing the subregional
interest. See id. at app. I.
292. Id. at art. 3.
293. Id. at art. 4.
294. Id. at art. 5. For example, the "Junta" may
conduct a study or convoke a meeting of the parties.
295. Id. at art. 6.
296. Id. at art. 7.
297. The Decision provides for a summary proceeding
where time is of the essence. Id. at art. 8. Art. 9
delinesates the fators the "Junta" will consider in
analyzing the situation.
Under the provisions of the Decision, the "Junta" can
authorize restrictions on and import barriers to those
products which interfere with competition. 29 8 The restric-
tions are subject to approval by the commission. 299 The
Commission has a right of direct review of the "Junta's"
resolution within sixty days after the effective date of the
resolution. 300
If the offensive practices emanate from a country out-
side the subregion,30 1 and affect products granted a com-
promise, the affected state must request that the "Junta"
apply Article 8 restrictions. The "Junta" and Commission
must be notified of any independent action taken. 302
When the "Junta" determines that the conduct invoking
article 8 restrictions has ceased, it notifies the State
and lifts the restrictions.
30 3
The Decision places an affirmative obligation upon the
bodies of the Cartagena Agreement to evaluate conduct which
interferes with competition. This facilitates characteriza-
tion of practices as either per se offensive or as accept-
able within certain parameters.
298. Id. at art. 11.
299. Id. at art. 10. If no action is taken by the
Commission, the decision of the "Junta" remains in effect.
300. The countries seem to be non-Andean Group Latin
States as opposed to third party nonmembers, i.e., the
United States.
301. Id. at art. 12.
302. Id. at art. 13.
303. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Regimen uniforme de la
Empresa multinacional y reglamento del trataminento applic-
able al capital subregional. (Decisi6n 46). 10 D.D.L.I.
190 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Acuerdo de Cartagena:
Regimen Uniforme].
D. Regime on Multinational Enterprises
Article 28 of the Agreement imposes upon the
Andean States the task of developing a common regime for
the treatment of subregional capital. The Commission
enforces this article. The Uniform Regime on Multinational
Enterprises and Regulation of Subregional Capital 304 was
promulgated by the Commission on December of 1971 to
fulfill this mandate.
A subregional investor is defined as the national
investor of a member state other than the recipient coun-
try. 30 5 The purpose of the Decision is to encourage
investments in a newly created vehicle; the Multinational
Enterprise (MNE).306 Toward this end, the investor
obtains authorization from the NCA of the country of origin
to invest in an MNE or to transfer capital to the receptor
(host country). The NCA can establish a method of profit
remittance but may not authorize repatriation of capital or
transfer of profits to any country other than to the
country of capital origin. 307
Further, NCAs cannot authorize acquisition by foreign
investors of shares or rights of subregional investment prop-
erty. Sale of any shares or rights to an investor of a
304. Id. at I, art. 1. Note that the definition is
identical tO that employed by Decision 24A (as amended by
D. 103, art. 1 and also Decision 46, art. 5). Note also
that a foreigner can be a subregional investor. See id.
at art. 10.
305. Id. at art. 2.
306. Id. at art. 3.
307. Id. at art. 4.
different nationality must be authorized by the NCA of the
receptor country. 308
An MNE is an enterprise whose business purpose revolves
around either the sectorial pr6rams of industrial develop-
ment, infrastructure projects aimed at furthering integration,
programs rationalizing the production of existing indus-
tries and joint programs for the development of agriculture
and cattle raising, 30 9 or any other program the Commission
determines is of subregional importance. Moreover, an MNE
may not allow foreign participation greater than 40%. 310
Participation of national investors of member countries can-
311
not be less than 15% of the subregional total. Sub-
regional capital must be reflected in the technical, finan-
cial and administrative management of the firm.312 The
capital of an MNE is evidenced by denominated shares,
313
the value of which is expressed in the monetary unit of the
enterprise's country of principal domicile.
3 1 4
The charter of this enterprise must conform to the
requirements of Articles 8 and 9,315 as well as to the
requirements of national legislation. 31 6 The promoters
must obtain authorization from the Commission certifying
compliance with Articles 8 and 9 of the Cartagena
308. Id. at ch. II, ch. III, art. 8, 9.
309. Id. at art. 10.
310. Id. at art. 11.,
311. I d. at art. 8. The decision establishes special
payment schedule when investors include Bolivian or Ecua-
dorian nationals. Id. at art. 12.
312. Id. at art. 14.
313. Id. at art. 15.
314. Id. at art. 19.
315. Id. at art. 18.
316. Id. at art. 19.
317
Agreement. After receiving the documents, the NCA must
forward copies to the "Junta" and the other member
318
states. The NCAs of the other states may, upon a
finding of deviation from Article 8, complain to the NCA of
the enterprise's principal domicile. 31 9 This complaint
must be made within sixty days of receiving the documents
characterizing the MNE. After the sixty days have expired,
or after problems have been resolved, the NCA of principal
domicile shall conclude the charter.
32 0
The benefits 32 1 of MNEs are found in Chapter VI of the
Decision. MNEs enjoy the advantages of the liberalization pro-
322
gram. They are entitled to treatment equal to that of
national investors 32 3 in matters pertaining to state acquisi-
tion of their products and they are not subject to divestment
requirements of the Code. 324 MNEs have access to internal
credit 32 5 also equal to that of national investors and they
require no prior authorization to reinvest profits. 326 They
are entitled to participate in the economic activities of the
member states reserved for national enterprises. 327 If they
317. Id. at art. 20.
318. Id. at art. 21.
319. Id. at art. 22.
320. See generally Saavedra, El regimen uniforme
de la empresa multinacional en el Grupo Andino, 11 D.D.L.I.
(1972); Perezin, Multinational Companies Under the Andean
Pact -- A Sweetener for Foreign Investors? 7 INT'L. LAW.
396 (1973).
321. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Regimen Uniforme, supra
note 303, at ch. V, art. 28.
322. Id. at art. 30.
323. Id. at art. 31.
324. Id. at art. 34.
325. Id. at art. 33.
326. Id. at art. 36.
327. Id. at art. 35.
receive NCA authorization, these investors have the right to
transfer any actual net profits resulting from their direct
investment after taxes.
328
Finally, article 37 establishes that MNE's shall enjoy
the benefits of trade liberalization and relaxed restrictions
on transfer of start-up capital in all the member states.
They are entitled to the benefits granted by articles 30-36
in the member states whose nationals participate in capitali-
zation according to article 11.329
E. Subregional Technological Policy
During their Thirteenth Extraordinary Session,
which took place between May 27 and June 5 of 1974, the
Commission of the Agreement of Cartagena adopted Decision
No. 84 entitled "Bases For A Subregional Technological
Policy." 330  The decision recognizes the enormous role
that technology plays in development 3 31 and undertakes to
establish within the subregion the scientific and technical
infrastructure required for development. 332
328. Id. at art. 37.
329. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Bases para una politica
technologica subregional, 16 D.D.L.I. 131 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Acuerdo de Cartagena: Bases]. The deci-
sion is pursuant to mandate of articles 25, 27, 38, 70 and
106 of the Agreement, as well as Decisions 24 and 46.
330. Id. at 131-32.
331. The decision envisions a process consisting of
several stages. During the first stage information is to be
exchanged, existing technological infrastructure is to be
perfected and new ones developed through special projects
and incentives. During the second stage an evaluation is to
take place of the results obtained during the first stage
and policy formulated thereon. The provisions to be
analyzed are geared to enable this first stage to bear
fruit. (Among the documents utilized by the Commission in
arriving at the Decision was document Com/XIII/dt.2/ Rev.l
which addressed "Fundamental Consideration for a Subregional
Policy of Technological Development."). Though space does
not allow a full analysis of the document, it is reproduced
at 16 D.D.L.I. 138 (1974).
332. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Bases, supra note 329,
at ch. II, art. 2(a).
The decision imposes on the member states a common
policy with the purpose of promoting the application of
technical know-how favoring subregional development.
3 3 3
This promotion should be made with a view toward equalized
development between small and medium states and large
states.
The decision requires the member states to take "con-
crete action" to promote to various programs of development
including evaluation, selection and control of imported tech-
nology, 3 35 the simulation, adaptation and copying of for-
eign technologies 33 6 and the search for obtaining and dif-
fusing of information relating to available technology.
33 7
Chapter III addresses imports of technology. It
imposes upon the NCAs of member states a duty to evaluate
contracts involving importation of technology to determine
its effect on the subregion. The NCAs analyze the repercus-
sions of such imported technology on the development of
indigenous technology, its contributions to specific pro-
jects of interest to the nation or the subregion and the
effect on the balance of payment. 33 8 When the technology
affects the national interest, the decision requires that an
applicant present alternative sources of available tech-
nology, their cost and the reasons for the applicant's
choice to the NCA.
339
333. Id. at art. 2(c).
334. Id. at art. 4(c).
335. Id. at art. 4(d).
336. Id. at art. 4(f). See also United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, Committee on Transfer
of Technology. "Legislation and Regulation on Technology
Transfer: Empirical Analysis of their Effects in Selected
Countries", TD/B/C.6/55 28 August, 1980.
337. See note 330 supra, at ch. III, art.
7(a)(c)(d). The term, balance of payments, is not defined.
338. Id. at art. 8.
339. Decision 24 at art. 2 and 19.
In addition to the information required by the
Code,340 the NCA may also request information which would
enable them to categorize the components of the imported
technology into those which should be obtained locally and
those which must be imported. 341 All member state NCAs
must cooperate 342 in the investigation of sources of tech-
nology. All member states must also incorporate the results
and those related to Decision 24 into the norms, guides and
financing requirements of projects or studies commissioned
by them. 343
Chapter IV establishes the method by which technology
is to be assimilated and developed. It directs member
states to create incentives to stimulate demand for tech-
nology. 34 4 Further, it obligates member states to con-
tract with natural persons, national firms, and mixed and
multinational firms consulting, engineering and related pur-
poses, 34 5 whenever possible.3 46 Contracts must involve
national, mixed or multinational enterprises.
34 7
The Commission may, upon recommendation of the
"Junta," approve "Andean Projects of Technological Develop-
ment." The projects serve one of two functions. They
either seek solutions to specific technological problems
340. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Bases, supra note 329,
at art. 9.
341. Id. at art. 10.
342. Id. at art. 11.
343. Id. at ch. IV, art. 12(a).
344. "As opposed to persons or enterprises from third
party states." It is clear that this would not exclude
foreign participation since the enumerated vehicles may all
encompass a degree of foreign participation. Id.
345. Id. at art. 12(b).
346. Id. at art. 12(c).
347. Id. at art. 13. Article 12(e) and (f) mandate
member states to adopt capitalization schemes for such
projects. Article 14 requires the Junta to consider levels
of development (and technological needs) when giving priority
to states.
of common interest, or they develop diplomatic strategies
for participation in international technology markets. Two
or more member states may present such a plan to the
"Junta." If the "Junta" decides that the plan is feasible,
it makes a proposal for implementation to the
Commission.
3 48
To be acceptable, the project proposal must include a
definition of the problem addressed, the objectives of the
project, including justification for the particular choice,
an estimate of possible social and economic benefits, the
technological and scientific activities necessary for the
execution of the project, a means for participation by
other member states, as well as other specified data.
3 49
A financial plan must also be provided. 350
F. Industrial Property
The Andean Group has also regulated the subject of
Industrial Property. In June of 1974, during their Thirteenth
Extraordinary Session, the Commission adopted Decision 85.351
348. Id. at art. 16, 18.
349. Id. at art. 17. The remaining text of the deci-
sion relates to support tasks and common programming.
Chapter V lays down rules and guidelines for the implementa-
tion of such projects. The purpose is to assure as much as
possible subregional sharing of benefits. Such matters
include determination by the Junta of the effect of the
technology, a mandate to search in common for solutions to
technological problems, etc. Chapter II provides for other
general matters such as requiring member states to adopt
guides by which the Andean Corporation can participate in
such projects.
350. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Propriedad Industrial:
Reglamento para la applicacion de las normas sobre
propieded industrial, 16 D.D.L.I. 162 (1974).
351. The chapter is divided into nine sections. The
first addresses requisites for patentability; the second,
who can hold titles; the third, the application process;
fourth, how the NCA is to treat the application; fifth, the
rights the patent grants; sixth, obligations imposed upon
the holder; seventh, the system of licenses; eighth, legal
protection; ninth, nullity of the patent. Id.
This decision introduces regulations for patents, licenses,
trademarks and other intangible property rights.
352
Chapter I addresses patents, and provides for the
grant of a patent to new inventions or improvements on
existing inventions with industrial application. 3 53 A
"new invention" is one which has not been made public via
an oral or written description. The new invention cannot
have been made available for production through any means
prior to presentation of the application.
35 4
An inadvertent disclosure does not constitute publica-
tion which would divest the inventor of a right to a
patent. An inventor has not lost his patent right if he
has exhibited the invention in an exposition recognized by
a member state, or if he has conducted experiments to deter-
mine the patent's application to industry.
35 5
Any invention which can be manufactured and used in
industry may merit a patent. 3 56 The following are not
eligible for a patent: scientific principles and
discoveries, the discovery of material existing in nature,
commercial, financial and accounting plans, game rules and
357
any other abstract system.
No patents will be granted to inventions which will
operate contrary to public policy. No patent will be
issued for inventions relating to essentially biological
procedures. Pharmaceutical or nutritional products for
352. Id. at ch. I, § 1, art. 1,
353. Id. at art. 2.
354. Id. at art. 2(a)(b).
355. Id. at art. 3.
356. Id. at art. 4.
357. Esthetic creations and therapeutic methods for
diagnostic treatment of humans or animals are also
excluded. Id. at art. 5.
products for human, animal or vegetable use are also excluded
from patentability. No intellectual property right will be
granted as a result of the solicitation of a foreign
invention if a prior solicitation has been submitted in
another state. 358
Patents can be held by natural or juridical persons.
The first applicant obtains the patent right if granted,
except where there are joint applicants. In the latter
situation, the applicants hold the patent right in
common.35 9 An inventor whose invention has been stolen
can challenge and gain title to the patent during the
ninety days following publication of patent solicitation or
he can seek judicial action if the patent has already been
granted. 3 60  The proceeding in opposition is commenced by
filing at the National Office. The actions are then
forwarded to the proper jurisdictional body. The applicant
must answer according to the rules of his country. There
is a two year statute of limitation for bringing an
opposition proceeding. 361
Unless otherwise agreed, an invention created by an
employee under contract shall belong to his employer.
3 62
A prior patent solicitation in any member state grants the
applicant priority in all the member states. 36 3 All
applications are to be made to the national office.
3 6 4
Once presented, the patent application is examined
by the national authority to determine whether it meets
358. Id. at ch. I, § 2, art. 6.
359. Id. at art. 7.
360. Id.
361. Id. at art. 8.
362. Id. at art. 10.
363. The statute provides a list of required informa-
tion at art. 11.
364. Id. at ch. I, § IV, art. 14.
patentability requirements and whether the proper documents
have been filed. 36 5 If the authority does not find com-
pliance, it must notify the applicant. The applicant has
sixty days in which to correct the problem. If the appli-
cant does not correct the application within this time, he
is deemed to have abandoned the application. Generally,
once an application is filed it cannot be altered other
than as required by the respective national office. 366
If the invention is approved, notice of the pending
patent must be published. 36 7 During the next ninety
days anyone may oppose the application. 368 The applicant
may defend his invention by showing its merit within sixty
days. 3 6 9 After the sixty day period, the national auth-
ority weighs the patentability of the invention. 370 If
the invention is deemed meritorious, the patent or an
amended patent will be issued.
37 1
Member states may conduct examinations on the state of
art which may affect patentability in specific sec-
tors. 37 2 The national authorities may seek expert opinion
to determine the novelties of the invention. 3 73 Member
states must notify one another and the "Junta" of patents
granted. 37 4 A patent on an invention affecting national
security can be restricted. 375 The classification and
ordering of patents must conform to the International
365. Id. at art. 15.
366. Id. at art. 16.
367. Id. at art. 17.
368. Id. at art. 18.
369. Id. at art. 19.
370. Id. at art. 20.
371. Id. at art. 21.
372. Id. at art. 22.
373. Id. at art. 26.
374. Id. at art. 24.
375. Id. at art. 25.
Classification of Invention Patents, subscribed to on
December 19, 1954. Member states had to subscribe to this
system within a year of the decision's effective date.
37 6
A patent grants its holder the exclusive rights to
sell the invention, to grant licenses and to receive
royalties or compensation for allowing third parties to
market the invention. The patent does not award an exclu-
sive right to import the patented product or one produced
377
by the patented process. The patent is granted for a
maximum of ten years.
37 8
Once granted, the patent holder must report within a
three year period to the national authority that he has
commenced using the patent. 379  The patent holder must
also register any license or assignment or any other
arrangement allowing a third party title to the
patent. 380
Licenses granted third parties are invalid unless they
are in writing. They must also be registered and approved
by the national authority.38 1 A patent holder who has
not reported use of the patent within three years may find
that the state has licensed someone else to use the patent.
Several reasons advanced for providing an individual with
compulsory licensing included the following: failure to
use the patent within three years, suspension of use for
one year,
376. Id. at sec. V,. art. 28.
377. Id'. at art. 29. Originally for five, renewable
for five more.
378. Id. at sec. VI, art. 30(a).
379. Id. at art. 30(b).
380. Id. at sec. VII, art. 32. This means, as art.
33 makes clear, that the licenses must conform to Decision
24 (art. 20).
381. Id. at art. 34. Art. 35 allows the national
authority to grant licenses whenever it deems the process
requires more than one exploiter.
failure of production to meet national marketing needs, or
the patent holder's refusal to grant a license on reason-
able terms. After five years, the national authority can
grant the license without reference to any of the afore-
mentioned bases. The holder of the compulsory license must
pay the patent holder adequate compensation.3 82 Compen-
sation is fixed by the national authority after hearing the
parties. 383
Once a compulsory license is granted, it must be used
or statutory sanctions may also authorize its divesti-
ture. 3 84 The use of a patent without authorization from
its holder or the national authority is subject to
fine. 385
Decision 85 also provides for the registration of
models and drawings. 38 6 This process parallels the
procedure described for patents except that there are no
provisions made for compulsory joint ownership. 387
Chapter III addresses trademarks. It provides that
services or trademarks which are distinctive or novel can
be registered3 88 by private or public enterprises, coop-
eratives or any other grouping of juridical persons.
38 9
382. Id. at art. 38.
383. Id. at art. 41.
384. Id. at art. 42.
385. Id. at ch. II, art. 45-55. The patent holder
must then pursue a private remedy provided by national law.
386. Article 55 imposes upon the members the
obligation, of subscribing to the International
Classification established by the Arrangement of Locarno,
October 8, 1968, within a year of the decision's effective
date.
387. Id. at ch. III, § 1, art. 56.
388. Id. at art. 57.
389. This prohibition goes to the form, its color or
shape, descriptive markings or any other signals, any word
(in any language) which has become usual designation (has
acquired secondary meaning). Also forbidden are any
unauthorized reproduction of emblems, coats of arms,
markings of a state or international organization, those
Applications are rejected if the related trademark would
contravene public policy or would generally confuse the
consuming public. 39 0 An applicant who has not met any
other statutory requirement will be directed to correct the
mistake, within sixty days once the mistake is corrected.
If the application is then approved, the trademark
is published in a journal chosen by the legislature.
Within thirty days, parties may file an opposition
proceeding. 391 Classification is made according to the
International Agreement of Nice, signed June 15, 1957.392
Registration grants exclusive right to the trademark.
3 93
The trademark may be cancelled if the holder abuses
it, 394 or when the registration expires.
395
V. THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTEGRATION
At their first meeting, the Andean Pact leaders
recognized the need to respond in a uniform manner
3 96
marks which may be confused with one already granted,
names, pictures, pseudonyms of living persons or of
deceased people without authorization of their heirs. A
person may trademark his own name as long as it is
sufficiently distinctive. Id. at art. 58.
390. Id. at arts. 61-67.
391. Id. at art. 68.
392. Id. at art. 72.
393. Manipulated price or quality or entered into
other conduct detrimental to the public. Id. at art. 75.
394. Id. at art. 76.
395. See, e.g., Vicufta, La creaci6n de un
tribunal de justicia en el Grupo Andino, 15 D.D.L.I. 31,
33 (1974), for a study of the principle conflicts involved
in legal structures for integration. See generally
Paolillo y Carlos, in Estudio de los procedimientos de
hecho utilizados para la solucion de conflicts en la ALARL
(A study on the proceedings made to solve conflicts in
LAFTA), 9 D.D.L.I. 73 (1971).
396. Zalduendo, El Tribunal Andino de Justicia, 4
Inteqraci6n Latino-Americana 32 (1979).
to various enforcement bodies' interpretations of the
Agreement, and any Decisions and Resolutions resulting
397
therefrom. The reaction of the "Junta" was to submit
to foreign governments a proposal for a Court of Justice.
By 1974, the "Junta" had submitted to foreign governments a
projected treaty to establish a Court of Justice. The
"Junta" discussed the proposal 3 98 "and partially modified
[it] until a definitive version was considered in
successive reunions of plenipotentiary representatives
convened to negotiate the treaty of the tribunal's creation
which took place in Lima in February and March of
1979.,
39 9
In the context of Andean subregional integration, the
complexity of the Andean Group mandates a judicial arbiter.
The Agreement imposes a regional judicial structure upon
the national structure, the former having priority over the
latter.
397. The experts at these meetings included Professor
Gerard Olivier, Deputy General Director of the Legal Ser-
vice of the European Community and Dr. Pierre Pescapore, a
judge on the European court. Walter Munch, General Direc-
tor of the Juridical Service of the Commission of the Commu-
nities and Maurice Lagrange, Attorney General of the Court
of the Communities as well as a host of Latin jurists.
398. See Zalduendo, supra note 396. "The absence
of a judicial organ is explained partly because in the
majority of the cases the scheme of integration was con-
ceived by economists as a relatively simple mechanism of
free trade.... On the other hand ... [economists feared]
the implantation of an economic scheme which could often
clash with the legal norms enunciated within the tradi-
tional perspectives of national development. It was feared
that the process' association with national jurist, who
often were not familiar with the development of inter-
national law and the law of an integration movement could
be a factor of paralysis ... above all the risk of
restricted interpretations by national legislatures. This
coupled with the traditional fear of these states to submit
to any international jurisdiction was another factor.
See Vicufla, supra note 395, at 31.
399. See generally Zalduendo, supra note 396;
Vicufla, supra note 395. For a full exposition of the
legal theory underlying the relationship of the Junta, the
Commission and the individual states see Amador, supra
note 258.
It has been previously noted that the principal policy
instruments are the Decisions4 00 approved by the
Commission, and the Resolutions, the "Junta's" mode of
judicial expression.
States participating in a scheme of cooperation
seek methods of convergence through permanent nego-
tiations ... the institutional route generally is
... an organ integrated by plenipotentiary dele-
gates ... whose decisions are taken unanimously
and who lacking unanimity bind only those voting.
For [their] part integration schemes create organs
with appropriate decision making powers ... [these
decisions] are generally taken by majority and
obl % te all members even those who voted against
it.Mu
Building international economic integration structures
creates new relationships between sovereign states. One
current example is the European Economic Community. 402
The institutional system of the Andean Group is
similar to that of the European Community. 40 3  It is
400. Zalduendo, supra note 396, at 33. The Decision
is characterized by its binding nature and its direct
application to member states. It obligates member states
to codify their internal policies.
401. "The structure of the European Economic Commu-
nity comprehend one organ, the Council, formed by delegates
of the member states which still look like the traditional
international organs but (also) three additional institu-
tions with different objects ... the Commission, guardian
of the common interest, whose members, independent and not
removable receive their investiture by collective decision
of the states and which are not subjected to represent the
national interest of their country of origin. The European
Parliament, the expression of popular opinion, and the
Court of Justice, custodian of judicial values." Id.
402. Indeed, they get more so each year. See Andean
Group: Agreement establishing the Andean Council, 3 INT'L.
LEGAL MATERIALS 612 (1980). See also Salazar, Solu-
ci6n de conflitos interestatales para la integraci6n
economica y otras formas de cooperaci6n econ6mica, 28-29
D.D.L.I. 20 (1975).
403. Vicuha, supra note 395, at 38.
not surprising that the rationale and structure of the
judicial system should also be similar. In its proposal,
the "Junta" addressed three basic considerations. First,
integration was to be carried out subject to the rules of
the Agreement, and pursuant to an unquestioned application
of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Second, a
forum was necessary to represent national interests.
Third, it was essential to prevent inevitable conflicts
from destroying the community.
40 4
The Treaty 4 05 creating the Court establishes the
juridical structure as that set forth in the Cartagena
Agreement, its Protocols and Additional Instruments, the
Treaty establishing the Court, Decisions of the Commission
and Resolutions of the "Junta." 406 The Agreement
provides that Decisions are obligatory on all member states
as of the date they are approved by the Commission.
4 07
Decisions must therefore be incorporated as internal
law.40 8  The "Junta's" resolutions enter into force on
the date and under conditions established in the
Resolutions. 409
404. Andean Group: Treaty Creating the Court of Jus-
tice of the Cartagena Agreement (Signed at Cartagena, May
28, 1979), 18 INT'L. L. MATERIALS 1203 (1979). Since the
agreement is considered a treaty, it is not dependent upon
the existence of LAFTA. Further should LAFTA fail, the
Agreement of Cartagena would survive as a mechanism of this
new treaty. The preamble states:
Certain that both the stability of the Cartagena
Agreement and the rights and obligations deriving
from it must be safeguarded by a juridical entity
at the highest level, independent of the govern-
ments of the member countries and from the other
bodies of the Cartagena Agreement, with authority
to define communitarian law, resolve the contro-
versies which arise under it and to interpret it
uniformly.
405. Id. at ch. I, art. 1.
406. Id. at art. 2.
407. Id. at art. 3.
408.
409. Id. at art. 4.
The Court, designated as one of the principal institu-
tions of the Cartagena Agreement 410 is composed of five
justices (nationals of the member countries), who are to be
fully independent in the exercise of their functions.
4 11
Justices are chosen from lists presented by each member and
selected by unanimous vote of the plenipotentiaries
412
designated for this purpose. There are two alternates
designated to replace any judges who die or who are
otherwise removed. 41 3 A justice may be removed upon
complaint of a member if, in the exercise of his function,
414
he has committed any statutorily proscribed acts. The
Court enjoys the privileges and immunities recognized under
international practices. 415
The Court may nullify any Decision of the Commission
and any Resolution of the "Junta" which violates the Agree-
ment's juridical structures. 4 16 Any natural or juridical
person who is affected by a Decision or Resolution may seek
to have the Decision or Resolution nullified by the
court. 417
410. Id. at art. 6.
411. Id. at art. 7.
412. Id. at art. 8. Justices serve a six year term,
and can be reelected once. There is a partial turnover
every three years.
413. Id. at art 10.
414. Id. at art. 11. These acts are enumerated in
the statute of the Court. The statute is to be approved by
the Commission and is to govern both the functioning of the
Court and the judicial procedure to which the causes of
action contemplated by the Treaty shall be subject. Id.
at art. 14. The Commission can also create the position of
Attorney General. Id. at art. 7.
415. Id. at art. 13.
416. Id. at ch. III, art. 17.
417. Id. at art. 19. Note that foreigners are not
specifically excluded. It is presumed that they can insti-
tute such proceedings ... since by now foreigners can only
own up to 49% of an enterprise.
Member states are estopped from bringing an action of
nullification unless the Decision in question was approved
without the member's affirmative vote. 418 Any such
action must be commenced within a year of the offending
legislation's effective date. 419 A violator of
Cartagena's norms must conform to any directives by the
Court.
The treaty also provides for the "Junta" to commu-
420
nicate noncompliance to any offending member. If the
member state's noncompliance persists, the "Junta" is
authorized to initiate a proceeding seeking the Court's
decision on the matter. 4 21 A member state may initiate
the same procedure. If the "Junta" issues its opinion but
does not initiate action within two months, the complainant
may present the matter directly to the Court. Moreover, if
the Junta has not issued an opinion after three months, the
422
country can then proceed directly to the Court, which
will issue a ruling on the controversy. If the Court finds
noncompliance, it will determine to what extent the
aggrieved party may suspend or limit the advantages of the
Agreement. 42 3 The parties may file a petition for review
within one year of the date of the ruling, or within two
months of the discovery of information which alters the
Court's ruling. 424 Natural and juridical persons also
418. Id. at art. 18.
419. Id. at art. 20.
420. Id. at art. 22. The members must then comply
within two months.
421. Id. at art. 23.
422. Id. at art. 24.
423. Id. at art. 25.
424. Id. at art. 26.
have the right to institute suit in the national forum of
the noncomplying state.
4 25
The Court may render advisory opinions to national
judges who require an interpretation of any matter
concerning the juridical structure of the Agreement,
provided that the ruling is appealable within the
national system. Otherwise, the Court is forbidden from
interpreting the content and scope of domestic law or from
judging the substantive facts of the case. 426
The member states must submit any dispute related to
the Agreement or to any part of its juridical structure to
the Court. Member states are forbidden from seeking
settlement of any such controversy in any other forum.
427
States must conform to the Treaty requirements without
reservation.4 28 Article 38 is a significant and most
interesting provision of the Treaty. It provides that the
Treaty shall remain in effect so long as the Cartagena
Agreement is in effect. The Cartagena Agreement and the
Treaty also remain in effect independently of the Treaty of
Montevideo. 429 These provisions ensure the survival of
the Andean Group, independently of the failure of the
Treaty of Montevideo of 1960.
VI. CONCLUSION
The initial focus of this discussion is the legal
structure controlling foreign investments within the
Andean region. An examination of the underlying social
and political influences is imperative to the successful
development of this topic. Perhaps in no other area
425. Id. at art. 27.
426. Id. at art. 30.
427. Id. at art. 33.
428. Id. at art. 36.
429. Id. at art. 38.
is the interaction between law and popular political
expression so inextricably interconnected as in Latin
American investment.
Latin American statesmen have been influenced by much
more than the desire to see their countries rise to a
position of power and authority in the world. What
distinguishes Latin American leaders from others is the way
they control the "fire lighted under their feet." A
popular political expression, which many style the
"revolution of rising expectations," has ensured that the
civilian leader who accomplishes little or who does not act
quickly has no political future.
Many scholars and politicians who have analyzed the
economic and political structure of underdeveloped
countries have been convinced that American domination of
the international economy has transformed Latin American
states into U.S. "economic appendages."
The more belligerent states responded to American
economic domination with expropriation. Tenuous legal
concepts, the sensitive nature of foreign relations, and
State Department response to such expropriations has
largely convinced U.S. Courts that they are not equipped to
address this dilemma.
Social scientists have sought to understand expro-
priation by developing institutional models. One such
model posits that military education, usually superior to
the civilian education Latin leaders probably received, has
created an expanded concept of national security. The
"enemy" is no longer limited to soldiers on the field. The
"enemy" is anything or anyone who lends credence to the
political subversives within the nation. The oft-repeated
charge that the future of Latin America is in the hands of
foreigners is an example of this expanded concept of
national security.
Certainly, these theories are not mutually exclusive.
When considered together, they led to the conclusion that
if foreign investments were to be secure within Latin
states, some sort of structure would have to develop to
assuage popular expression, and at the same time encourage
much needed foreign investments.
This type of structure was created within Decision 24.
Decision 24 regulates the form and extent of foreign
participation in the Andean countries' economic
development. The benefits and drawbacks of a strategic
approach have been displayed in the implementation of the
Decision.
Drawbacks were evidenced by Chile's withdrawal from
the Agreement. Chile's reaction may be summarized by the
adage that "those who need must accept, they cannot impose
obligations on the providers." On the other hand,
Venezuela's entry is an indication of the Agreement's
potential benefits.
Decision 24 was only the first of a series of laws
aimed at subjecting the foreign investor to the will of the
state. One of the principal targets of dependency
theorists were the restrictive clauses foreigners employed,
and the ramifications of such clauses on national
development.
Decision 45 extends the mandate in Decision 24 in this
regard by regulating competition. Decision 46 provides a
format to control subregional capital and creates the mul-
tinational firm. Multinational firms are promoted and
owned by nationals of the Andean states though they permit
limited foreign participation. The firms serve as the
vehicle by which specific developmental tasks are ad-
dressed. Decision 84 involves the formulation of a subre-
gional technology policy. Decision 85 regulates patents,
trademarks, licenses and royalties.
The opportunities for growth and development created
by Decision 24 are apparent in its implementation by the
Andean Group. The Decision has facilitated the creation of
a Court of Justice, the ultimate arbiter of disputes. The
Court is specifically authorized to address the legality of
the Commission's Decisions, providing a "checks and bal-
ances" system for the Andean government.
This study is far from exhaustive of any of the areas
addressed. Its aim was a comprehensive overview of the
laws regulating the various aspects of investment in a
foreign climate. This aim was accomplished by means of an
analysis of the political and economic underpinnings of
foreign investment laws.
As the Andean Court gains in stature, the community
interest will probably become more clearly defined, and
perhaps, the Decisions herein analyzed will be reassessed.
Meanwhile, the foreign investor may choose the means which
allow him to benefit from duty free trade. Moreover, for
the first time in decades he has a guarantee that his
property in an Andean Pact member state will remain his
own, and will not be seized, so long as he adheres to the
rules.
